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FOREIGN INVESTORS IN U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS:
THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES
Jeffrey M. Colon*
The United States is generally a tax haven for foreign portfolio
investors: the United States exempts from tax most U.S. source interest and
capital gains, but taxes dividends from U.S. companies; tax treaties
generally eliminate U.S. tax on interest and reduce the 30% statutory rate
on dividends.
Foreign investors in U.S. mutual funds have not been treated as
favorably. Fund distributions (other than of net capital gains) were
originally treated as taxable dividends, regardless of the fund’s underlying
income. Interest or short-term capital gains earned by the mutual fund —
which would have been tax exempt if directly earned by a foreign investor
— were converted into taxable dividend income when distributed.
To encourage foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds, Congress in
2004 modified the mutual fund distribution rules to exempt from tax fund
dividends that are attributable to the fund’s U.S. source interest income or
short-term capital gains. The stated goal of the legislation was to tax foreign
investors on the same basis as if they had directly earned their share of a
fund’s income.
These provisions fail to fully achieve this goal by denying pass-through
treatment for foreign source interest and dividends. This policy appears to
be aimed at preventing foreign investors from using a U.S. mutual fund to
obtain U.S. treaty benefits.
Foreign source income should retain its source and character when
distributed to foreign shareholders. This tax treatment is consistent with the
tax results a foreign investor realizes when he or she invests directly or
through a partnership and encourages foreign investment in mutual funds
that invest globally. The treaty shopping concerns may be illusory. To
address potential treaty abuse, Congress could consider limiting the passthrough of foreign source income to treaty residents.
*

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank David
Danone, Barnet Phillips IV, and participants of the Fordham Law School faculty workshop
for their comments on prior drafts and April Colaku for her research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. mutual funds hold roughly 50% of the worldwide total net assets
1
of all mutual funds. U.S. mutual funds provide many potential benefits to
investors, including diversification, regulatory oversight, professional
2
investment management, economic exposure to a wide variety of asset
classes, daily liquidity for shareholders of open-end funds, simple
procedures to reinvest income, and instant liquidity for shareholders of
3
closed-end and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Mutual funds offer small
domestic investors access to foreign markets and issuers that would be
4
practically impossible to accomplish through direct investment. The basic
U.S. tax and regulatory regime governing mutual funds has been stable for
5
seventy years, and U.S. mutual fund management fees are among the
6
lowest in the world.
U.S. mutual fund shareholders have benefited from a relatively benign
7
tax regime in Subchapter M. If a fund satisfies certain requirements
regarding the composition and distribution of its income, the fund avoids
1

INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 219 tbl.60 (54th ed. 2014)
[hereinafter FACTBOOK], https://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf. In 2013, U.S. mutual
funds held $15 trillion in assets, and the total worldwide assets of mutual funds were $30
trillion.
2
Mutual funds can be divided into those funds that offer active management, in
which fund managers trade securities based on their views of expected future price, and
passive management, in which managers construct their portfolios to match a particular
index, such as the S&P 500 index.
3
There are mutual funds that offer exposure to commodities, foreign stocks and
bonds, and narrow sectors of the market.
4
To purchase foreign securities, an investor may have to open a foreign brokerage
and bank account and deal with foreign currency and tax issues.
5
Mutual funds are subject to the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(1)–(8) (2012). The tax rules governing mutual
funds are in Part I, Regulated Investment Companies (sections 851 through 855), of
Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). This article uses the terms “mutual
fund,” “fund,” and “RIC” interchangeably.
6
Ajay Khorana, Henri Servaes, & Peter Tufano, Mutual Fund Fees Around the
World, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1279, 1287–88 tbl.2 (2009) (finding that funds sold in the United
States had the lowest total expense ratio in a sample of eighteen countries).
7
See supra note 5.
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entity-level taxation; instead, the fund’s shareholders are taxed on fund
distributions. Moreover, unlike dividends paid by other U.S. corporations,
dividends paid by a mutual fund partially reflect the tax character of the
underlying fund income, such as net capital gain and tax-exempt interest.
By characterizing certain portions of mutual fund dividends in accordance
with the fund’s income, Subchapter M aims to impose roughly the same tax
burden on fund shareholders had they directly earned their share of the
8
fund’s income, i.e., modified pass-through treatment.
For foreign persons investing directly in U.S. stocks, bonds, and
derivatives, the United States is a tax haven: most U.S. source interest
income and capital gains of foreigners are exempt from tax regardless of
amount. Dividends paid by U.S. corporations, royalties paid for the use of
intangible property in the United States, and gains from the sale of U.S. real
property interests are generally the only types of passive investment income
9
taxed by the United States.
In contrast to the favorable U.S. tax regime for foreign direct
investment, Subchapter M historically has been less hospitable to foreign
investment. Before 2004, Subchapter M recharacterized only a fund’s net
10
capital gains and tax-exempt interest when they were distributed. A fund
distribution was otherwise treated as a U.S. source dividend even though it
was economically attributable to the fund’s underlying foreign source
11
interest, dividends, or short-term capital gains. Consequently, a foreign
8

See infra Part II.B.
U.S. source dividends and royalties are taxed at 30%. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1)
(U.S. source dividends and royalties paid to foreigners are subject to a 30% tax). Treaties
reduce the 30% rate on dividends to 15%, 5%, or 0% depending on the recipient’s ownership
percentage of the payor corporation. I.R.S. PUB. 515, Withholding on Tax on Nonresident
Aliens and Foreign Entities 51 tbls.1 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/
international/Tax_Treaty_Table_1.pdf. Source basis taxation of royalties is generally
eliminated under treaties. Id. Rental income from U.S. property is also potentially subject to
flat 30% tax, but since rental property generally constitutes a U.S. trade or business, rental
income is taxed at graduated rates (with allowance for deductions). Id. This article focuses
solely on income traditionally earned by RICs such as capital gains, interest, and dividends,
and will not further discuss the taxation of royalties and real estate income.
10
Certain mutual funds are able to pass through foreign tax credits. See I.R.C. §
853(a)(1) discussed infra Part II.B. A dividend that is attributable to a fund’s qualified
dividend income is treated as a qualified dividend, regardless of a particular investor’s
holding period in the fund shares. See I.R.C. § 854(b)(1)(B). Notice 2004-39 sets forth rules
for applying the differing tax rates in section 1(h) to the capital gains dividends paid by
RICs. I.R.S. Notice 2004-39, 2004-1 C.B. 982. These rules are only relevant for U.S.
taxpayers.
11
Since a RIC is a U.S. corporation, a dividend paid to a foreign investor would be
9
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investor in a U.S. mutual fund often faced a significantly higher U.S. tax
burden than if the investor had earned directly his or her share of the fund’s
income.
To encourage foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds, Congress
amended in 2004 sections 871(k) and 881(e) of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) to exempt from tax mutual fund dividends paid to foreign investors
if the dividends are attributable to a fund’s interest income and short-term
12
capital gains. The stated goal of the legislation was to tax foreign mutual
funds investors on the same basis as if they had directly earned their share
13
of the fund’s underlying income.
The legislation, however, fails to fully implement this policy goal. In
particular, only U.S. source interest is reclassified; foreign source interest
and dividends are not reclassified, and when they are distributed to a
14
foreign shareholder, they are a taxable U.S. source dividend.
Consequently, a foreign investor that owns a global money market, bond, or
stock fund will be taxed on the fund’s foreign source income even though it
would have been exempt from U.S. tax had the foreign investor directly
earned the foreign source income.
The legislative history does not discuss the rationale for excluding
foreign source income. Earlier versions of the 2004 legislation provided for
look-through treatment for foreign source interest that was exempt from
15
foreign tax without regard to a treaty. The limitation on reclassifying
foreign source income thus appears to be motivated by a concern that
foreign investors could invest in a Regulated Investment Company (RIC)
and indirectly obtain U.S. treaty benefits that the investors could not obtain
16
directly.
taxed at 30%. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1) (U.S. source dividends paid to foreigners are
subject to a 30% tax rate). Capital gain dividends paid by a RIC were exempt from U.S. tax.
See infra note 59.
12
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 411(a)(1).
13
H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 164 (2004).
14
I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E) (defining qualified interest income to include only U.S. source
interest).
15
See infra Part. III.D.
16
The extension of look-through treatment for foreign investors in U.S. mutual funds
raises a policy question of whether such treatment should also be expanded for U.S. persons.
Income, such as nonqualified dividends, interest, and short-term capital gains, is taxed at the
same rates for U.S. taxpayers. The character of the income, however, can still matter because
of its interaction with a U.S. taxpayer’s other income. The failure to pass through short-term
capital gains does not fully implement Subchapter M’s policy goal of tax transparency and
seems unnecessarily detrimental to U.S. taxpayers.
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This article first briefly reviews the U.S. taxation of foreign portfolio
investors and U.S. mutual funds and their U.S. shareholders, and it
discusses why foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds had been
historically tax inefficient. It then analyzes and critiques the 2004
amendments and explores the complications that arise when applying
treaties to RICs. It builds on and extends two important articles that
examine the treatment of foreign investors in U.S. funds and the
17
international tax issues of global investment funds.
This article argues that the treatment of a RIC’s foreign source income
is inconsistent with the policy goals of the 2004 amendments and the
general goal of neutrality of tax treatment of portfolio returns earned by
investing directly or through a mutual fund, and it recommends extending
look-through treatment to all foreign source income. This article
demonstrates that the treaty shopping concern is mostly illusory, but it
considers alternatives such as limiting look-through to foreign investors
who are eligible for treaty benefits. This could be done on a unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral basis.
II. THE TAXATION OF U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS AND THEIR U.S.
SHAREHOLDERS
A. Regulated Investment Companies
The tax rules governing mutual funds and their shareholders are found
in Subchapter M, the contours of which were largely established in the
18
Revenue Act of 1942. To qualify as a RIC, an entity must be a domestic
corporation (including a trust taxed as a corporation) and must be generally
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a management
19
company or unit investment trust.
A RIC avoids corporate-level tax by satisfying certain distribution,
gross income, and diversification tests. A RIC satisfies the distribution test
by distributing 90% or more of its investment company taxable income
17

See Robert J. Staffaroni, Foreign Investors in RICs and REITs, 56 TAX LAW. 511 (2003);
Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-Border Problems of Investment Funds, 60 TAX LAW. 583
(2007).
18
See Jeffrey M. Colon, Oil and Water: Mixing Taxable and Tax-Exempt
Shareholders in Mutual Funds, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 773, 778–788 (2014).
19
I.R.C. § 851(a)(1)(A)–(B). Certain common trust funds can also be taxed as RICs.
I.R.C. § 851(a)(2). Common trust funds are funds maintained by a bank to collect and invest
capital received in its capacity as a trustee, etc., in connection with fiduciary accounts such
as trusts and estates. I.R.C. § 584(a).
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20

(ICTI),
which is regular corporate taxable income with certain
21
adjustments, such as the exclusion for net capital gains (NCGs). A RIC
avoids corporate-level tax on its NCGs if it distributes 90% or more of its
22
NCGs. In calculating its ICTI and NCGs, a RIC deducts dividends of the
23
ICTI and NCGs paid to its shareholders. The deduction for dividends paid
is the mechanism by which RICs avoid corporate-level tax.
To satisfy the gross income requirement, a RIC must derive at least
90% of its gross income from investment-type income such as dividends,
interest (both taxable and tax-exempt), income from securities lending,
gains from the sale of stock and securities, gains realized from foreign
currencies, and derivatives based on stocks or securities such as options,
24
forwards, and futures. The underlying premise of the gross income
requirement is that RICs should focus on earning investment income as
25
opposed to operating income.
20

I.R.C. § 852(a)(1)(A). The deduction for dividends paid must equal or exceed 90%
of ICTI determined without regard to the deduction for dividends paid (excluding net capital
gain dividends and exempt-interest dividends). Id. Although tax-exempt interest is not ICTI,
a corporation must also distribute 90% of its tax-exempt income (less allocable expenses).
I.R.C. §§ 852(a)(1)(B), 851(b). When distributed, tax-exempt interest retains its character if,
at the close of each quarter, at least 50% of the RIC’s assets are tax-exempt obligations.
I.R.C. § 852(b)(5). If a RIC is not eligible to pay a tax-exempt dividend, the interest will
generate earnings and profits for the RIC and when distributed will constitute a taxable
dividend.
21
I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A)–(C).
22
I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A). NCGs are the excess, if any, of net long-term capital gains
(NLTCGs) over net short-term capital losses (NSTCLs). NLTCGs, in turn, are the excess, if
any, of long-term capital gains over long-term capital losses, and NSTCLs are the excess, if
any, over short-term capital losses over short-term capital gains. I.R.C. § 1222. Thus, longterm losses and short-term losses in excess of short-term gains reduce NCGs.
23
I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(D) (allowing for dividends, other than capital gains and exemptinterest dividends, to be deductible in computing ICTI), (b)(3)(A) (subjecting RICs to a tax
on the NCGs less capital gains dividends paid).
24
I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). Dividends also include Subpart F inclusions under section
951(a)(1)(A)(i) and certain passive foreign investment company (PFIC) inclusions. I.R.C. §
851(b) (flush language); Treas. Reg. § 1.851-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1978). Also included is
income related to a RIC’s investment activities. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2)(A). To avoid failing the
gross income test, a RIC can interpose a foreign corporation to hold the property that is
generating the nonqualifying income. See Willard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and
the Entity Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1 (2010), for a discussion of the use of such
entities.
25
See John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Management
Regulation: 1936-1942, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 341, 357 (2012) (finding that investing in
ETFs helps alleviate the tax burden generated by the distribution requirement). See also
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In keeping with Congress’s goal of RICs being passive investors, the
diversification tests ensure that RICs will generally not own controlling
interests in their portfolio companies. RICs are subject to two
26
diversification tests, the 50% and 25% tests. The 50% test requires that at
least 50% of a RIC’s total assets consist of cash, government securities,
27
securities of other RICs, and securities of other companies.
In making
this calculation, however, a RIC can only count the securities of a single
issuer in an amount up to 5% of the RIC’s assets, and it may not count more
28
than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer. In addition, no
more than 25% of a RIC’s total assets can be invested in a single issuer, the
securities of certain publicly traded partnerships, or two or more issuers that
the RIC controls and are determined to be engaged in the same or similar
29
trades or businesses.
B. U.S. RIC Shareholders
A RIC that satisfies the distribution, income, and diversification tests is
not subject to corporate-level tax to the extent it distributes its ICTI and
NCGs. Instead, a RIC’s shareholders are taxed on the dividends received. A
goal of the RIC tax regime is to tax shareholders similarly to how they
would have been taxed had they directly earned their share of the RIC’s
income. Consequently, distributions of NCGs, tax-exempt interest, and
30
31
qualified dividends retain their tax character when distributed.
William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive
Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 90–91 (2008)
(examining the tax advantages for mutual funds created by investing in ETFs).
26
I.R.C. § 851(b)(3) (both of these tests are determined quarterly).
27
I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A).
28
I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii). With respect to securities where market quotations are
available, “value” means the market value; with respect to other securities and assets,
“value” means a fair value as determined by the board of directors. I.R.C. § 851(c)(4).
29
I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(B)(i)–(iii). Control is defined as “ownership in a corporation of
20% or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.”
I.R.C. § 851(c)(2). A RIC is protected against failing the diversification tests solely because
of subsequent changes in value of the securities in the portfolio. I.R.C. § 851(d)(1) (stating
that a RIC will not fail a diversification test solely as a result of changes in the value of a
portfolio from one quarter to the next, unless the diversification test is not satisfied
immediately after the acquisition of any security and is partly or wholly the result of such
acquisition).
30
I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B)(i)(I), (iii) (defining a qualified dividend as a dividend from a
domestic corporation if the shareholder satisfies certain holding period requirements). I.R.C.
§§ 1(h)(11)(D)(iii) (subjecting dividends issued by a RIC to the limitations set forth in
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Not all distributed income, however, retains its tax character. In
particular, short-term capital gains become ordinary dividends when
distributed. This can be unfavorable to an individual taxpayer with capital
losses because short-term gains can offset a shareholder’s capital losses
without limit, whereas an individual can use only up to $3,000 of capital
32
losses against ordinary income, such as dividends, interest, and wages.
Although the failure to pass-through the character of short-term capital
gains is generally detrimental to an individual shareholder, the RIC regime
is sometimes more beneficial than direct investment. In computing ICTI, a
RIC deducts management expenses solely against ICTI and not against
33
NCGs or qualified dividend income. This netting rule ensures that
expenses are not netted against tax-favored income but against ordinary
income. Moreover, if a shareholder directly held the fund’s securities, the
34
deduction for investment expenses would probably be limited.
Certain RICs are eligible to pass through foreign income taxes paid.
Under section 853(a), a RIC can elect to pass through foreign income taxes
paid to its shareholders if more than 50% of the value of the RIC’s assets
35
consists of stock or securities in foreign corporations. In such case, in
computing its income, each RIC shareholder must include a proportionate
share of the RIC’s foreign taxes paid as foreign source income, and in
computing its foreign tax credit, it must treat the proportion of the dividend
received attributable to the RIC’s foreign source income as foreign source
36
income.

section 854), 854(b)(1)(B)(i)(III) (prescribing that a dividend received from a RIC whose
qualified dividend income is less than 95% of its gross income is qualified dividend income
to the extent designated by the RIC), 854(b)(4) (stating that the term “qualified dividend
income” as used in section 854 has the same meaning as under section 1(h)(11)(B)).
31
A RIC shareholder can be taxed on a fund’s gains accruing before the investor
became a shareholder. See Colon, supra note 18, at 817–28.
32
I.R.C. § 1211(b).
33
I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A) (excluding NCGs from ICTI); Rev. Rul. 2005-31, 2005-1
C.B. 1084 (“A RIC’s investment company taxable income equals its taxable income
(exclusive of net capital gain) reduced by allowable expenses and its deduction for dividends
paid determined without regard to capital gains dividends and exempt-interest dividends.”).
34
If a taxpayer’s trading does not constitute a trade or business, investment expenses
would be deductible only to the extent that they exceed 2% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income. I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 212. Pursuant to section 67(c)(2), the Treasury is prohibited from
treating expenses of publicly offered RICs as being subject to the 2% floor of section 67.
I.R.C. § 67(c)(2).
35
I.R.C. § 853(a).
36
I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A)–(B). The statute specially provides that the foreign source
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Since a $1 tax credit reduces taxes by $1, it usually is more beneficial
for a RIC to pass foreign taxes through to its shareholders than to deduct or
37
credit them against its ICTI. It is likewise generally more beneficial for a
U.S. taxpayer to elect the foreign tax credit under section 901 than to
38
deduct the foreign taxes.
If a RIC does not make the section 853 election, either because it opts
not to or because it does not hold the requisite percentage of foreign assets,
39
the RIC may elect to credit the taxes pursuant to section 901 or simply
40
deduct them from ICTI under section 164. If a RIC deducts the foreign
taxes, ICTI is decreased by the amount of the foreign taxes, and a RIC’s
shareholder’s taxes are roughly reduced by the amount of the deduction
41
times the shareholder’s marginal tax rate.
Since not all of a RIC’s income retains its character when distributed,
the RIC regime can be described as a modified pass-through regime. The
failure to pass through the character and source of all RIC income
historically has made RICs a tax-inefficient vehicle for foreign investors.

characterization is for the purpose of computing the foreign tax credit and therefore does not
otherwise convert a RIC dividend into foreign source income. See I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(B). To
illustrate, assume that a RIC earns $10,000 of ICTI, $8,000 of foreign source income and
$2,000 of U.S. source income, and pays $1,000 of foreign taxes. If the RIC makes a section
853 election and distributes all of its ICTI, a shareholder will receive a dividend of $9,000
(the ICTI less the foreign taxes), but will have to include $10,000 in income (the dividend
plus the foreign taxes). If the shareholder elects the foreign tax credit under section 901, it
can potentially reduce its U.S. taxes by $1,000. See I.R.C. § 901(a). The actual amount that
can be credited will depend on the shareholder’s total U.S. and foreign source income and
allocable deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 861(b), 904 and the regulations thereunder. See infra Part
III.B (discussing the application of this rule to foreign investors).
37
The leading tax treatise on mutual funds states that eligible RICs typically make the
section 853 election to pass through foreign income taxes paid to its shareholders. SUSAN A.
JOHNSTON & JAMES R. BROWN, JR., TAXATION OF REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND
THEIR SHAREHOLDERS, ¶ 3.08[3][b][i] (2016). Using data for tax years 2003 and 2004,
however, one researcher estimates that less than 25% of eligible funds make the section 853
election. Janie Casello Bouges, When Mutual Funds Fail to Make Foreign Tax Elections:
What Does the Investor Lose?, 25 J. TAX’N INV. 33 (2008).
38
A deduction could be more beneficial than a credit for a taxpayer who has expiring
excess foreign tax credits.
39
I.R.C. § 901(a).
40
I.R.C. § 164(a)(3).
41
In limited circumstances, it can be beneficial for the RIC to retain up to 10% of its
income and elect to credit foreign taxes against its tax liability. See JOHNSTON & BROWN,
supra note 37, at ¶ 3.08[3][b][ii], for a discussion of when doing so can be beneficial.
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III. FOREIGN INVESTORS AND U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS
A. The U.S. Taxation of Foreign Portfolio Investors
42

Foreign portfolio investors are taxed at a flat 30% rate on U.S. source
income that is fixed, determinable, annual or periodic (FDAP), such as
43
interest paid by U.S. obligors and dividends from U.S. companies. Most
U.S. source interest, however, including interest on bank deposits and
44
portfolio debt, is exempt from the 30% tax. In addition, foreign investors
pay no U.S. tax on capital gains from the sale of debt instruments, most
45
stocks, options, commodities, and derivatives. Dividends paid by a U.S.
42

This article focuses solely on foreign portfolio or passive investment. A passive
investor is one who does not hold a sufficient interest in an entity to influence management’s
business decisions or control the entity. Portfolio investment is generally defined to be direct
or indirect ownership of less than 10% of an entity’s voting power. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, at 17 (4th ed. 2008) (describing how direct investors, in contrast to portfolio
investors, seek to establish a lasting interest in the enterprise and to influence management,
which is evidenced by owning at least 10% of the voting power of the enterprise). A foreign
person is a foreign corporation or a nonresident alien. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(5) (defining a
foreign corporation as a corporation not organized in the United States or under state law);
I.R.C. § 7701(b) (defining a nonresident alien as an individual that is neither a citizen nor a
resident of the United States).
43
I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (placing a 30% tax on the U.S. source FDAP income of
nonresident aliens); I.R.C. § 881(a) (placing a 30% tax on the U.S. source FDAP income of
foreign corporations).
44
I.R.C. § 871(i)(1) (granting an exemption for interest on bank deposits); I.R.C. §
871(h)(1) (granting an exemption for interest on portfolio debt). Portfolio interest is all U.S.
source interest on registered obligations, but it excludes certain contingent interest and
interest received by 10% shareholders. I.R.C. § 871(h)(4) (excluding certain contingent
interest); I.R.C. § 871(h)(3) (excluding interest received by 10% shareholders).
45
Gains from the sale of U.S. real property and stock of a U.S. company that is a U.S.
real property holding company are treated as effectively connected income and subject to
tax, unless the company is publicly traded and the seller owns 5% or less. I.R.C. § 897(a)(1)
(treating such gains as effectively connected income); I.R.C. § 897(c)(3) (exempting such
gains when the company is publicly traded and the seller owns less than 5%). With the
exception of gains from the sale of U.S. real estate, capital gains of foreign persons are
neither FDAP income nor generally subject to U.S. tax. The heading to section 871(a)(1),
which describes FDAP income, limits its application to “income other than capital gains.”
See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.871-7(a)(1) (as amended in 1997) (stating that
nonresident aliens are generally not taxable on “gains from the sale or exchange of
property”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2013) (excluding gains from the
sale of property from FDAP income for withholding tax purposes). In addition, the sale of
personal property, including stocks and bonds, by a foreign person is generally foreign
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corporation and passive royalties received for the use of intangible property
in the United States are the only passive investment income taxed by the
United States. The foreign source investment income of foreign persons
without a U.S. trade or business, such as interest paid by a foreign obligor
or dividends from a foreign corporation, is naturally exempt from U.S.
46
tax.
The United States has a long history of encouraging foreign investment
in U.S. stocks, bonds, and commodities, even for large-scale investment
activity. Trading in securities can sometimes constitute a trade or business
if the taxpayer executes a sufficient number of trades throughout the year
and attempts to profit from short-term price movements rather than price
47
increases that reflect longer-term strategies. Since 1936, foreign investors
have benefited from two statutory trading safe harbors, one for “trading”
and the other for “trading for one’s own account.” A foreign investor
trading its own funds will not have a U.S. trade or business even if it has a
U.S. office and hires employees with or without discretionary authority to
48
effect the transactions. Trading on behalf of others through a broker or
other independent agent is also not a U.S. trade or business if the investor
does not have an office or fixed place of business in the United States
49
through which the transactions are effected. If a foreign investor’s trading
source income and therefore exempt. See I.R.C. § 865(a)(2) (qualifying income from the sale
of personal property by nonresidents, which includes nonresident aliens with a foreign tax
home and foreign corporations, as foreign source income). U.S. source capital gains from the
sale of intellectual property contingent on use in the United States are subject to U.S. tax
under section 871(a)(1)(D) as are U.S. source capital gains of nonresident aliens present in
the United States for 183 days or more. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2). Derivative income is
generally sourced by the residence of the recipient, except to the extent that a foreign person
receives a dividend equivalent payment, i.e., a payment that is determined by reference to a
U.S. source dividend. See I.R.C. § 871(m).
46
See I.R.C. § 872(a)(1) (including only U.S. source income in the gross income of a
nonresident alien not engaged in a U.S. trade or business).
47
See, e.g., Estate of Yaeger v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1101 (1988), aff’d, 889
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989); Ball & Northrop v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 184 (2000). If a
foreign investor’s activities rise to the level of those of a trade or business, the United States
taxes the effectively connected income at graduated rates with deductions for ordinary and
necessary business expenses. I.R.C. § 871(b).
48
I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (excluding from the term “trade or business” the
trading of stocks, securities, and commodities for a non-dealer taxpayer’s own account). See
Erika W. Nijenhuis, The Section 864(b)(2) ‘Trading in Derivatives’ Safe Harbor, 39 TAX
MGM’T. MEMORANDUM (BNA) 371 passim (Nov. 9, 1998), for a discussion of this
provision.
49
I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C) (trading through U.S. broker or other
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activity falls within these safe harbors, the activity will not constitute a U.S.
trade or business regardless of the number of trades, the amount traded, or
the gain recognized; the foreign investor’s capital gains will be exempt
from U.S. tax; and the FDAP rules will apply to the investor’s U.S. source
interest and dividends.
The U.S. policy is to encourage foreign capital to flow unimpeded by
source basis taxation. Underlying this policy is the belief that this capital
increases market liquidity and helps to lower the cost of capital for all
businesses, and that the lost revenue from source taxation is compensated
by the increased income of U.S. intermediaries, such as brokers and
advisers.
The United States has entered into sixty-seven bilateral income tax
treaties, which modify the application of domestic tax rules for treaty
50
residents.
The principal aim of tax treaties is to mitigate tax avoidance
and double taxation, which is accomplished primarily by significantly
reducing or eliminating source country taxation. Under most U.S. treaties,
any residual tax on U.S. source interest is eliminated, the 30% tax on
royalties is eliminated, and the 30% rate on dividends is reduced to a
51
maximum rate of 15%. For shareholders owning more than 10% of the
payor corporation, the treaty dividend rate generally drops to 5%, and in
recent treaties, the dividend rate drops to 0% for distributions from 80%52
owned subsidiaries or to pension plans.
Given the favorable tax treatment accorded to foreign passive investors
under the Code and tax treaties, the United States holds itself out as a tax
haven for passive foreign investment capital. In 2011, foreigners received
$568 billion of U.S. source income, of which $509 billion (90%) was
53
exempt from tax. $444 billion (78% of all payments) was paid to treaty
54
residents. Of the $59 billion subject to tax, only $8.9 billion of tax was

independent agent does not create a trade or business provided that a taxpayer has no U.S.
office or fixed place of business).
50
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-IncomeTax-Treaties—-A-to—Z.
51
For a table summarizing the treaty rates applicable to U.S. source income received
by treaty residents, see I.R.S. PUB. 515, Withholding on Tax on Nonresident Aliens and
Foreign Entities 51 tbl.1 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/international
/Tax_Treaty_Table_1.pdf.
52
Id.
53
Scott Luttrell, Foreign Recipients of U.S. Income, 2011, STAT. INCOME BULL. 8 tbl.1
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-init-id1501.pdf.
54
Id.
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collected ($5.4 billion was collected from treaty investors). Foreign
investors received $110 billion of U.S. source dividends, of which treaty
56
residents received about 90%. These data demonstrate that treaty residents
57
supply most of the foreign capital invested in the United States.
B. The U.S. Taxation of Foreign Investors in RICs
Although the United States has long been a tax haven for direct foreign
portfolio investors, accessing U.S. capital markets indirectly through RICs
has been historically tax inefficient for foreign investors. Gain realized by a
foreign investor on the sale of shares of a U.S. mutual fund has been treated
similarly to the gain from the sale of other capital assets and therefore
58
exempt from U.S. tax. In addition, under long-standing administrative
guidance, distributions of capital gain dividends by U.S. RICs have been
59
treated as tax-exempt capital gains for foreign shareholders. The tax
inefficiency specifically arose with respect to mutual fund distributions that
were treated as ordinary dividends and therefore taxed at 30% (unless
reduced by a treaty) even though the dividends were attributable to a fund’s
short-term capital gains, interest income, foreign source dividends, or swap
income. If a foreign investor had directly earned any of this income, it
60
would have been exempt from U.S. tax.
55

Id.
Id. at 9 tbl.1.
57
One can assume that treaty residents also supply indirectly a portion of the capital
invested by nontreaty residents, e.g., through investment in entities in the Cayman Islands.
58
In an open-end mutual fund, an investor may request that the fund redeem his or her
shares at net asset value (NAV). Since 2010, a redemption of shares of a publicly traded RIC
is treated as a sale or exchange and not a dividend regardless of the percent of the shares
redeemed. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(5).
59
See Rev. Rul. 69-244, 1969-1 C.B. 215, obsoleted by T.D. 8734, 1997-2 C.B. 109
(stating that capital gain dividends do not constitute fixed or determinable annual or
periodical income under section 1441 and are not subject to withholding under sections 1441
and 1442). In addition, a RIC (or intermediary such as a bank or brokerage house) can elect
to reduce withholding on distributions representing capital gain dividends (and exempt
interest dividends). Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(c)(2)(i)(D) (as amended in 2015). Special rules
for RIC distributions are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(c)(3)(i)–(ii) (as amended in 2015).
60
Prior to 1986, distributions from RICs that invested primarily in foreign securities
could be treated as foreign source income and therefore exempt from U.S. tax. Rev. Rul. 69235, 1969-1 C.B. 190, held that dividends and capital gains dividends paid by a RIC to a
nonresident alien were foreign source income if 80% or more of the RIC’s gross income was
foreign source. The 80% rule was based on former section 861(a)(2)(A), which was effective
for payments made before January 1 1986, and which provided that if less than 20% of a
56
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To add further insult to injury, a foreign investor in a RIC that makes a
section 853 foreign tax credit election may also be taxed on the foreign
taxes paid by the RIC even though the investor does not actually receive the
61
income. Section 853(b)(2)(A) provides that each shareholder of a RIC
that makes a section 853 election must “include in gross income and treat as
paid by him his proportionate share of such taxes.” For a U.S. shareholder,
this provision places the shareholder in the same position had he or she
directly earned the foreign source income and prevents a shareholder from
62
obtaining the benefit of a deduction and credit. To ensure that a U.S.
investor can credit the foreign taxes, section 853(b)(2)(B) treats as foreign
source income the portion of the RIC dividend that represents both the
63
grossed up foreign taxes and the associated foreign source income.
For a foreign investor, however, this provision is punitive. Since a
foreign investor only receives as a dividend the cash the RIC receives after
64
foreign taxes, a foreign investor is taxed on income it never receives.
U.S. corporation’s gross income was U.S. source, any dividend paid by the corporation was
foreign source if less than 20% of the gross income for the three years preceding the
distribution was U.S. source. Former I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(A), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 1214(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2542 (1986) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 861, 871),
effective for payments after December 31, 1986. After the amendment, all dividends from
U.S. corporations, except corporations that had a section 936 election in effect, were U.S.
source. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(2). The same ruling held that if 20% or more of the RIC’s
income was from U.S. sources, capital gains dividends would be U.S. source. This was
primarily relevant for nonresident aliens who were subject to tax under section 871(a)(2); a
nonresident not subject to section 871(a)(2) would not be taxed on capital gains regardless of
their source. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2).
61
See I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A).
62
Assume a RIC earns $100 of foreign dividends subject to a withholding tax of $15
and distributes $85 to its U.S. shareholder. If a RIC were able to pass through the $15 of
foreign taxes to the shareholder but the shareholder did not have to gross up the $85 received
by the $15 of foreign taxes, the shareholder would get a double benefit for the $15—a $15
deduction ($100 minus $15) coupled with a $15 credit against $85. Instead, a shareholder is
treated as receiving a $100 dividend with a $15 credit, which is the same tax treatment as if
the shareholder had earned directly the foreign source income.
63
Id. In the absence of this rule, the dividend would be treated as U.S. source in its
entirety. When this provision was enacted, however, a dividend from a RIC that invested
primarily in foreign assets could have been foreign source. See Rev. Rul. 69-235, supra note
60.
64
Under the gross up rule in section 853(b)(2)(A), if a RIC receives a $100 dividend
subject to a source base tax of $15, the RIC distributes $85, but a foreign shareholder has
FDAP income of $100 on which the U.S. withholds 30%, unless a treaty applies. Prior to
1986, dividends from a fund that invested primarily in foreign assets would have been
foreign source and the resourcing rule would be superfluous except for those foreign funds
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Since the resourcing rule of section 853(b)(2)(B) applies only for purposes
of determining a taxpayer’s foreign tax credit, and since foreign portfolio
investors are not eligible to credit foreign taxes against their FDAP liability,
both the dividend received and the foreign tax gross up are U.S. source
65
income.
To stimulate foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds, in 2004,
Congress extended look-through treatment for a RIC’s U.S. source interest
66
and short-term capital gains for foreign shareholders. The potential
adverse effects for foreign shareholders of a RIC making a section 853
election, however, were left untouched.
C. Expanding Look Through for Foreign Shareholders
67

In the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress modified the
treatment of RIC dividends paid to a foreign shareholder by providing for
look-through treatment to the extent that the dividends were attributable to
a fund’s interest income (“interest-related dividends” (IRDs)) or short-term
68
capital gains (“short-term capital gain dividends” (STCGDs)).
The motivation for the change was twofold. First, Congress noted the
disparate U.S. tax consequences to a foreign investor investing directly in a

that could not satisfy the 80% rule of former section 861(a)(2)(A). See supra note 60.
65
I.R.C. § 906(b)(3) (denying nonresident aliens and foreign corporations the ability to
credit foreign taxes against their FDAP tax liabilities). In addition, a foreign investor could
not deduct the foreign taxes against his or her FDAP liability. See C.C.A. 2001-52-046
(Nov. 21, 2001) (confirming that foreign tax gross up and RIC distribution is U.S. source
income and that the resourcing rule applies only for foreign tax credit purposes for Puerto
Rican residents).
66
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 411(a)(1), 118 Stat.
1418, 1500.
67
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Various versions of the legislation had been
introduced in previous sessions of Congress. See, e.g., S. 1748, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991);
S. 1733, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993); H.R. 2015, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); H.R. 2018,
106th Cong. § 305 (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 1669, 108th Cong. § 305 (1st Sess. 2003).
68
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 411(a)(1); I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(A) (exempting
foreign individuals from the FDAP tax on IRDs); § 881(e)(1)(A) (providing the same
exemption for foreign corporations); § 871(k)(2)(A) (exempting foreign individuals from the
FDAP tax on STCGDs); § 881(e)(2) (providing the same exemption for foreign
corporations). In addition, IRDs and STCGDs are exempt from withholding. I.R.C. §§
1441(c)(12) (stating that there is no withholding on IRDs and STCGDs paid to
nonresidents), 1442(a) (stating the same for foreign corporations). A fund must inform its
shareholders of the amount of an IRD or a STCGD. See I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(C)(i) (applying to
an IRD); § 871(k)(2)(C)(i) (applying to a STCGD).
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fund’s underlying securities and indirectly through a fund. In addition,
Congress was concerned that U.S. mutual funds were developing offshore
parallel funds for foreigners to mitigate the tax inefficiencies of the U.S.
RIC regime and wished to encourage U.S. financial institutions to bring
70
such activities on-shore:
[T]he Committee believes that, to the extent a RIC distributes to a
foreign person a dividend attributable to amounts that would have
been exempt from U.S. withholding tax had the foreign person
received it directly (such as portfolio interest and capital gains,
including short-term capital gains), such dividend similarly should
be exempt from the U.S. gross-basis withholding tax.
A STCGD is limited to a RIC’s qualified short-term gain, which is the
71
excess of net short-term gains over net long-term capital losses. By
according look-through treatment to short-term capital gains, the statute
converts what under pre-2004 law was ordinary U.S. source dividend
income taxed at 30% (unless reduced by treaty) into tax-exempt capital
gain. The exemption accorded to a RIC’s short-term capital gains is
consistent with the treatment of portfolio capital gains realized directly by
72
foreign investors.
The amount that a RIC can designate annually as an IRD is limited to
the RIC’s qualified net interest income (QII), which is a RIC’s “qualified
73
interest income” reduced by allocable deductions. QII is limited to certain
categories of U.S. source interest income, including short-term original
issue discount, interest on registered obligations, interest from certain bank
74
deposits, and any IRD received from another RIC.
69

H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 164 (2004).
Id.
71
I.R.C. § 871(k)(2)(D). Net short-term gain is the excess of short-term gains over
short-term losses. I.R.C. § 1222(5). Net long-term capital loss is the excess of long-term
capital losses over long-term capital gains. I.R.C. § 1222(8). Thus, long-term losses first
reduce long-term gains and then any net short-term gains.
72
Capital gains are not considered to be FDAP income subject to 30% tax under
section 871(a)(1)(A). I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A). In addition, capital gains realized from the
disposition of personal property by a foreign person are generally foreign source income and
are therefore not subject to a tax under sections 871 or 881. I.R.C. § 865(a)(2).
73
I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(D).
74
I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E)(i) (applying to short-term original interest discount), (ii)
(applying to interest on registered obligations), (iii) (applying to interest on bank deposits),
(iv) (applying to IRDs received from other RICs). Some categories of U.S. source interest,
70
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Even if interest satisfies the QII income test at the RIC level, an IRD
will be treated as a taxable U.S. source dividend if it is attributable to
interest on debt issued by the foreign shareholder or any corporation or
partnership with respect to which the foreign shareholder is a 10%
75
shareholder. The second restriction is designed to prevent a foreign
shareholder from using a RIC as a conduit for U.S. source interest that
76
would otherwise not be exempt under the portfolio interest rules.
To compute its IRD, a RIC must reduce its qualified interest income by
“properly” allocable expenses, guidance for which was provided in
however, are excluded from the definition of QII, such as interest received from a
corporation or partnership if the RIC is a 10% shareholder and interest that is contingent
interest. I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E)(ii)(I) (excluding interest if RIC is a 10% shareholder), (II)
(excluding contingent interest defined under section 871(h)(4)). The fact that a RIC owns
10% or more of the debtor taints all of the interest paid even though the RIC shareholder’s
proportionate share of the interest is significantly less. This approach is inconsistent with
treatment of interest held by a partnership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-14(g)(3) (as amended in
2015) (making the 10% shareholder determination at the partner level). These limitations
track exceptions to the portfolio interest rules under which U.S. source interest paid to a 10%
shareholder (and U.S. source contingent interest) do not qualify as tax-exempt portfolio
interest, and they are designed to prevent a foreign RIC shareholder from obtaining a U.S.
tax benefit that it could not obtain if it invested directly in the underlying assets. I.R.C. §
871(h)(3)(A) (excluding from portfolio interest any interest received by 10%-or-more
shareholder (determined by vote) and 10%-or-more partner (determined by capital or
profits); I.R.C. § 871(h)(4) (excluding from contingent interest, which is interest determined
by reference to receipts, cash flows, income, profits, or change in the value of property of the
debtor or a related person, or dividend or distributions made by the debtor or a related person
from portfolio interest).
75
I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(B)(i). An interest-related dividend will be taxable unless the
withholding agent receives a statement that the beneficial owner of the RIC stock is not a
U.S. person. I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(B)(ii). An IRD received by a controlled foreign corporation
(CFC) is treated as an ordinary dividend to the extent the dividend is attributable to interest
paid by a related person to the CFC. I.R.C. § 881(e)(1)(B)(ii). A person is related to a CFC if
the person is a U.S. shareholder of the CFC, a related person to the U.S. shareholder, or a
related person under section 267(b). See I.R.C. § 267(b). This rule tracks the portfolio
interest limitation applicable to CFCs. See I.R.C. § 881(c)(3)(C). Note, exempted from this
rule is any interest of the RIC attributable to short-term original issue discount and bank
deposit interest. See id. This rule similarly applies to IRDs received by CFCs. I.R.C. §
881(e)(1)(B)(i). Exactly how a RIC is to determine that its shareholder is a 10% shareholder
in another corporation or partnership is unclear.
76
The reason for the first restriction is unclear. If a foreign shareholder — individual
or corporate — issued debt, the interest paid on such debt would generally be foreign source
income and therefore would not constitute qualified interest income in the first place. See
I.R.C. § 861(a)(1) (determining the source of interest generally by the residence of the
obligor).
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77

Revenue Ruling 2005-31. Under the facts section of the ruling, a RIC
earned $10,000 of dividends (all qualified dividends (QDI)); $10,000 of
78
interest (all qualified interest); $5,000 of STCG; and $5,000 of net LTCG.
The RIC had $10,000 of general and administrative (G&A) expenses, and it
distributed $20,000 (total income less G&A expenses) to its U.S. and
79
foreign shareholders.
Because of the different tax regimes for foreign and U.S. taxpayers, the
RIC must make separate determinations for each. For U.S. shareholders, the
RIC must determine the portion of the dividend that is a NCG and QII,
80
since these amounts are subject to special tax rates. For foreign
shareholders, the fund must determine the portion that is an IRD, STCGD,
81
and NCG, since these amounts are exempt from tax.
The ruling first concludes that neither NCG, STCG, nor QDI are
82
reduced by expenses. Thus, for foreign shareholders, the RIC reports
$5,000 of NCG and $5,000 as STCGD, and for U.S. shareholders, $5,000
83
of NCG and $5,000 of QDI.
In determining the portion of the dividend that is an IRD, the RIC’s QII
is reduced by the portion of the G&A expenses equal to the percentage of
its ICTI (STCGs, interest, and dividends) that is qualified interest income.
84
Since the RIC’s QII constitutes 40% of the RIC’s ICTI, 40% of the G&A
expenses ($4,000) are allocated to QII resulting in an IRD of $6,000. This

77

Rev. Rul. 2005-31, 2005-1 C.B. 1084.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Although both qualified dividends and net capital gains are taxed at the same rates
for individuals, it is necessary to distinguish between them since the NCGs can be offset by
a shareholder’s capital losses up to the amount of the NCGs plus $3,000. I.R.C. § 1211(b). In
the absence of any NCGs, a shareholder can use only $3,000 of capital losses against his
other income. Id.
81
See supra note 68; I.R.C. 852(a)(1)(A).
82
These conclusions derive respectively from the statutory mechanism for taxing a
RIC’s NCG, see I.R.C. § 852(b)(3), the definition of QDI, see I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(D), and a
statement on the legislative history discussing STCGD (“In computing the amount of shortterm capital gain dividends for the year, no reduction is made for the amount of expenses of
the RIC allocable to such net gains.”). H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 166 (2004)
(emphasis added).
83
The distinction between ordinary dividend and qualified dividends is irrelevant for
foreign shareholders, as a RIC’s dividend income is not recharacterized under section
871(k). I.R.C. § 871(k).
84
Excluding NCG of $5,000, the RIC’s ICTI is $25,000. Qualified interest income is
40% of ICTI ($10,000/$25,000). See I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E).
78
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determination is relevant only for foreign shareholders; for U.S.
shareholders, the G&A expenses effectively reduce a RIC’s interest income
and short-term capital gain. Even though the sum of the amounts
determined for IRD, STCGD, NCG, and QDI ($26,000) exceed the actual
distributions, the ruling concludes that the RIC could apply different
designations to the dividends depending on whether the shareholder was a
foreign or a U.S. person, which ensures that U.S. and foreign shareholders
will only report collectively $20,000 of total dividends.
Prior to the issuance of the ruling, mutual funds faced a potential
dilemma in determining the amount of QDI and QII. If investment expenses
were only allocated against a RIC’s non-QDI income, QII could be reduced
85
or vice versa. This determination could have created a conflict between
U.S. and foreign shareholders.
This ruling is generally favorable to U.S. shareholders because it
allocates expenses away from favorably taxed income — NCG and QDI —
and thereby reduces less favorably taxed income such as interest and nonqualified dividends. The ruling is also favorable to foreign shareholders
because it allocates expenses away from NCGs and STCGs to interest and
dividends. Although expenses allocated to QII reduce income that is taxexempt in the hands of foreign shareholders, expenses allocated to
dividends of the RIC reduce income that is taxable at 30%. For an equity
RIC, the RIC’s dividend income is likely greater than interest income.
D. A Critique of the Statute
Although the legislative history to the foreign RIC provisions states
that a goal of the amendments is to tax foreign RIC shareholders on the
same basis as if they had directly earned their share of the RIC’s income,
the statute fails to accomplish this goal. None of a RIC’s foreign source
income is recharcaterized. In particular, the definition of qualified interest
income is limited to U.S. source interest income — the statute does not
recharacterize foreign source dividends (including similar income such as
Subpart F inclusions and passive foreign investment company inclusions),
interest, swap income, or foreign currency gains. These items count toward
the RIC income test, but constitute foreign source income in the hands of
the RIC, or would be foreign source income if earned directly by a foreign
85

Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to Barbara Angus,
Int’l Tax Counsel, Dep’t. of Treasury (Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with author); Steve Conlon,
The Best of Both Worlds, CAP. CHANGES IN DEPTH 3–4 (May 31, 2005), http://
business.cch.com/capChanges/CCID_02-04_05.pdf.
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86

investor.
Consequently, a distribution of a RIC’s foreign source interest, foreign
source dividends, or swap income is taxed as an ordinary U.S. source
dividend, even though had a foreign shareholder earned the income directly
it would have been exempt from U.S. tax. The legislative history
surprisingly does not shed any light on the rationale for these omissions.
Before the enactment of sections 871(k) and 881(e), similar bills were
introduced in prior legislative sessions as the Investment Competitiveness
87
Act. Some of these earlier bills included under the definition of QII
certain categories of foreign source interest:
(ii) any interest derived by the regulated investment company from
sources outside of the United States other than interest that is
subject to tax imposed by a foreign jurisdiction if the amount of
such tax is reduced (or eliminated) by a treaty with the United
88
States.
Thus, in these earlier versions, foreign source interest (but not foreign
source dividends) that was exempt from foreign taxes without regard to a
treaty would have constituted QII. The apparent focus of this exception was
interest paid on Eurobonds, which are bonds denominated in a currency
different from the currency of the countries in which they are issued and
89
sold. Like interest on portfolio debt, interest on Eurobonds is generally
90
91
exempt from domestic tax. As discussed below, this provision suggests
86

Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b) (as amended in 2012) (sourcing notional principal contract
income by the residence of the recipient); I.R.C. § 1293(a)(1) (requiring a shareholder of a
qualified electing fund (QEF) PFIC to include in income as ordinary income its share of the
PFIC’s ordinary earnings and as a LTCG its share of the QEF’s NCG); I.R.C. §
1296(c)(1)(A), (2) (recognizing that the gain on mark-to-market (MTM) election of
marketable PFIC stock is ordinary income and generally U.S. source income since MTM
gain is sourced in the same manner as the sale of stock); I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (requiring a U.S.
shareholder of a CFC to include in income subpart F income and any section 956 inclusion);
I.R.C. § 988(a)(3)(A) (stating that a foreign currency gain attributable to a section 988
transaction is ordinary income sourced by the residence of the taxpayer). See Willard B.
Taylor, Foreign Investment in Regulated Investment Companies, TAX MGM’T. INT’L J. (June
13, 2008).
87
See supra note 67.
88
See, e.g., H.R. 1669, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2003) (proposing new section
871(k)(1)(E)(ii)).
89
CHRIS O’MALLEY, BONDS WITHOUT BORDERS: A HISTORY OF THE EUROBOND
MARKET (2014).
90
John Glover, Eurobonds as Refugees from Tax Men Turn 50 in $4 Trillion Market,
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that treaty shopping concerns may account for the failure to extend lookthrough treatment to a RIC’s foreign source income.
By excluding foreign source interest, foreign source dividends, and
income that would be foreign source if realized directly by a foreign person
from look-through treatment, the statute fails to achieve its stated policy
goal of taxing foreign shareholders similarly to how they would have been
taxed had they directly earned their share of the underlying RIC income. In
addition, a foreign investor in a RIC making a section 853 election is
92
further penalized by being taxed on income that it never receives.
Consequently, RICs holding foreign assets or earning foreign source
income continue to be tax inefficient investment vehicles for foreign
investors compared to either investing directly or through a true pass93
through entity such as a partnership.
E. Investing Through Partnerships Compared to Investing Through RICs
The foreign RIC amendments impose significant tax burdens on
foreign shareholders to the extent a RIC earns income that is neither capital
gains nor U.S. source interest. In particular, a RIC’s foreign source interest
and dividends, and swap income are converted to taxable U.S. source
dividends when distributed by a RIC to a foreign shareholder. A foreign
investor’s U.S. tax burden is thus significantly different depending on
whether the investor invests directly in such assets or indirectly through a
RIC.
Instead of comparing the U.S. tax consequences to a foreign investor
that invests in a RIC with those arising from investing directly, one may
more appropriately compare a foreign investor’s RIC tax burdens to those
94
arising when investing in an investment partnership. An investment
partnership replicates the investment options available to a RIC
shareholder, such as professional investment management, back office
BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0623/eurobonds-as-refugees-from-tax-men-turn-50-in-4-trillion-market (“The most important
attribute of Eurobonds, by a mile, is that they’re free of withholding tax”). David Munves,
The Eurobond Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 167 et
passim (Frank J. Fabozzi & Moorad Choudhry eds., 1st ed. 2003).
91
See infra Part IV.D.
92
I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A).
93
Foreign assets constitute roughly 25% of the assets of U.S. equity RICs and 15% of
U.S. bond funds. FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 163 tbl.4.
94
The actual entity could be a U.S. or foreign partnership, a U.S. LLC, or a foreign
entity that is treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes.
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functions, and efficient executions of purchases and sales.
95
Assume a foreign investor is a partner in a U.S. or foreign partnership
that earns the following income: capital gains from selling U.S. and foreign
stocks; interest from bonds issued by U.S. and foreign issuers; and U.S. and
foreign source dividends. In addition, assume that the partnership falls
within the trading safe harbor and that there is no special allocation of the
96
partnership’s income or expenses. A partnership is not taxed on income it
earns; instead the partners are taxed on their distributive shares of the
97
partnership’s income. Pursuant to statutory mandates reflecting the
conduit nature of partnership taxation, the character of partnership income
98
passes through to the partners. For example, the LTCGs of a partnership
retain their character as LTCGs and must be separately reported, regardless
99
of the partner’s holding period in his or her partnership interest.
For partnerships with foreign partners or foreign source income, it is
generally necessary to determine and separately report the source of the
partnership income so that the partners can determine their U.S. tax
liability. Since foreign partners of an investment partnership are subject to
U.S. tax only on their distributive share of the partnership’s income that
constitutes U.S. source FDAP income, the partnership must separately

95

A domestic partnership is a partnership created or organized under the law of the
United States or any state. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4). A foreign partnership is a partnership that is
not domestic. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(5). In the case of a general partnership, it may not be clear
where it is formed since there are generally no state filing requirements.
96
If the partnership were engaged in a U.S. trade or business, the partners would also
be engaged in a U.S. trade or business, and the partnership income would be subject to
residence basis taxation in the hands of the partners. I.R.C. § 875(1) (stating that a foreign
partner is engaged in U.S. trade or business if partnership is so engaged). Unger v. Comm’r.,
58 T.C. 1157 (1990), aff’d, 936 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating the same for
partnerships with permanent establishment).
97
I.R.C. §§ 701, 702.
98
I.R.C. § 702(a) (requiring the partnership to separately state and the partners to
account separately for, inter alia, STCGs and LTCGs, qualified dividends, and other items
provided for in regulations); I.R.C. § 702(b) (stating that items of partnership income
required to be separately stated have the same character as if “realized directly from the
source from which realized by the partnership, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by
the partnership”). The reference to “source” in section 702(b) should not be interpreted to
refer to the source of income rules of sections 861 and 862, but instead to the character of
the income, e.g., earned income or passive income.
99
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-79, 1968-1 C.B. 310 (stating that a partner should take into
account his share of the partnership’s LTCGs even though the holding period of partnership
interest was less than the long-term period).
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100

report such income.
For U.S. partners, the partnership must separately
report the partnership’s foreign and U.S. source income and expenses so
101
that the partners can determine their U.S. foreign tax credit.
The initial task is to determine whether the source of an item of income
is determined at the partner or partnership level. The statutory mandate
implementing the conduit or aggregate concept of partnership taxation in
section 702 seems to require that the source of income should be
determined at the partnership level and then taken into account separately
102
by the partners.
The source of interest and dividend income, which is
determined by the residence of the payor, should be passed through to the
103
partners.
Consequently, a foreign partner would not be subject to any
U.S. tax on its distributive share of the partnership’s U.S. source portfolio
interest, foreign source interest, and dividends, but would be taxed on its
share of U.S. dividends and U.S. source interest that did not qualify as
portfolio interest.
Application of the source rules is more difficult when the source of the
income depends on the residence of the seller (as in the case of sales of
personal property) or where certain activities related to the generation of the
income occur (as in the case of income from personal services). The
difficulty arises because of the different tax results if an entity or aggregate
approach is adopted. In the case of sales, the partnership and individual
partners could have different residences, and in the case of services, the
individual partners could perform their services inside and outside of the
104
United States.
Section 865(i)(5) provides that the source of income from the sale of
personal property is determined at the partner rather than the partnership
105
level. This rule ensures that a foreign partner will realize foreign source
100

Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(ii) (as amended in 2005) (requiring that each partner
take into account separately any partnership item that would affect the partner’s tax liability
if it were not taken into account separately).
101
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(viii) (2016).
102
See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702.
103
Craik v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 132, 135 (Ct. Cl. 1940) (holding that under the
predecessor statute to section 871(b), the Revenue Act of 1918, a foreign partner of U.S.
partnerships is not subject to U.S. tax on its distributive share of foreign source income of
the U.S. partnership). See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 2, §§ 213(c), 218(a), 40 Stat. 1066,
1070. The source of certain guaranteed payments is not entirely clear. See Lewis R.
Steinberg, Fun and Games with Guaranteed Payments, 57 TAX LAW. 533, 535 (2004).
104
See Gregory May, Wrongs and Remedies: The U.S. Tax Treatment of Multinational
Partnerships of Individuals, 103 TAX NOTES 1509, 1510 (June 21, 2004).
105
I.R.C. § 865(i)(5). The statute grants the Treasury authority to change this result in
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income from the partnership’s sale of personal property, such as stocks and
bonds, and a U.S. partner will realize U.S. source income. For foreign
partners, this rule is generally of little consequence because capital gains
from selling personal property, whether U.S. or foreign source, are not
106
FDAP. For U.S. partners, the main consequence of this rule is that it will
107
affect the determination of a U.S. partner’s foreign tax credit. In addition,
sourcing partnership income at the partner level may slightly increase the
administrative burdens, since the partnership will have to segregate the
source of such income depending on the tax residence of the partners who
receive an allocation of the income.
Just as the sale of RIC shares by a foreign investor is exempt from U.S.
tax, a sale of an interest in an investment partnership should also be exempt.
First, under section 865, the sale of personal property, including intangible
108
property, of a foreign person is foreign source income.
Second, under
section 741, the sale of a partnership interest generates capital gain or loss,
unless the partnership holds any assets, such as unrealized receivables or
appreciated inventory, in which case a portion of the amount realized from
109
the sale of a partnership interest is treated as ordinary income. Since an
investment partnership generally does not hold receivables or inventory,
section 751 should not apply to a sale of a partnership interest by a foreign
regulations. Id. To date, no regulations have been issued. A U.S. citizen, resident alien, or
nonresident alien with a U.S. tax home is a U.S. resident, as is a U.S. corporation. Citizens
and resident aliens are not treated as having a foreign tax home (and being a foreign resident
for purposes of section 865) unless a tax of 10% is actually paid to a foreign country. I.R.C.
§ 865(g)(2).
106
I.R.C. § 871(a)(1). FDAP does not generally include gains from the sale or
exchange of property. See id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2013)
(excluding gains from the sale of personal property from FDAP income for purposes of
withholding). There is one situation in which the source of capital gains could matter for a
foreign person. Under section 871(a)(2), a nonresident alien present in the United States for
183 days or more during a taxable year is subject to a flat 30% tax on U.S. source capital
gains for that taxable year. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2). Since a foreign person who is resident in the
United States for 183 days or more is generally a resident alien, see I.R.C. §
7701(b)(1)(A)(ii), and thus is subject to residence basis taxation, this rule mainly applies
only to persons whose days of presence do not count for determining U.S. tax residency,
e.g., students and diplomats. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5). In order for section 871(a)(2) to apply,
these persons would also have to have a U.S. tax home or the gains would have to be foreign
source.
107
U.S. source income does not increase a U.S. person’s foreign tax credit limitation
under section 904. See I.R.C. § 904(a).
108
I.R.C. § 865(a)(2).
109
I.R.C. § 751(a).
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110

investor.
Finally, although the U.S. tax consequences to a foreign
investor selling a U.S. or foreign investment partnership interest are
identical, there are differences in the withholding requirements applicable
111
to a foreign and U.S. partnership.
A foreign investor in an investment partnership is only taxed on the
partnership’s U.S. source dividend income; foreign source income, capital
gains, and U.S. interest that is portfolio interest are exempt from U.S. tax.
Investing through a RIC that earns foreign source income is therefore
generally more tax inefficient than investing directly or through an
investment partnership because a foreign shareholder is taxed on the RIC’s
foreign source income. Additionally, when investing directly or through a
partnership, a foreign investor avoids U.S. tax on foreign taxes paid by the
investor or the partnership, which may not be the case when investing in a
112
RIC.
110

For U.S. investors, section 751 can apply since, under section 751(c), unrealized
receivable includes interest in certain foreign corporations described in section 1248. I.R.C.
§ 751(c)(2). In a controversial ruling, the Service adopted a look-through or aggregate
approach for the sale of a partnership interest by a foreign partner and held that a foreign
partner’s gain from the sale of a partnership engaged in a U.S. trade or business was
effectively connected income (ECI) to the extent that the gain was attributable to the ECI
property of the partnership. Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107. Gain attributable to the nonECI property was exempt foreign source income. Id. For a discussion of the revenue ruling,
see N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING REVENUE
RULING 91-32 (2014). The sale of an investment partnership not engaged in a U.S. trade or
business would not be ECI regardless of whether an aggregate or an entity approach were
adopted.
111
U.S. source FDAP income paid to a U.S. partnership is not subject to withholding.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5(b)(1) (as amended in 2014) (no withholding required on U.S. source
FDAP paid to U.S. partnerships). Instead, the U.S. partnership must withhold when such
amounts are distributed to a foreign partner or included in the foreign partner’s distributive
share of partnership income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5(b)(2) (as amended in 2014) (requiring a
withholding on distributions consisting of U.S. source FDAP paid to a foreign person or
when included in a foreign person’s distributive share on the earlier of (1) the date the K-1 is
mailed, or (2) the fifteenth day of the third month after the end of the partnership’s taxable
year). In the case of a foreign partnership that is a nonwithholding foreign partnership,
payments of U.S. source FDAP income to the partnership are treated as if made to the
individual partners, and the payor will withhold based on the tax status of the individual
partners. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5T(c)(1)(i) (2014). If the tax status of the individual partners
cannot be determined, it is presumed that they are foreign and the payee must withhold at
30%. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5T(d)(3) (2014). If the foreign partnership is a withholding
foreign partnership, the partnership and not the payor will withhold based on the tax status of
the partners. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5T(c)(2)(i) (2014).
112
See supra Part III.B.
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A RIC offers one potential advantage for foreign investors through the
treatment of investment expenses. In a RIC, investment expenses reduce
ICTI. If a RIC earns only U.S. source dividend income, for example, such
income is reduced by investment expenses, and a foreign investor is taxed
on the (net) distributed amount. In essence, a foreign investor receives a
deduction against U.S. source FDAP income, which would not be possible
113
if it received the income directly.
In the case of an investment
partnership, if the investment expenses are charged as a percentage of assets
under management (e.g., 1%), these fees would probably have to be
separately stated for foreign partners and would therefore not reduce U.S.
114
tax on U.S. source FDAP income.
The foreign mutual fund provisions fail to implement fully their
purported goal of imposing the same U.S. tax burdens on foreign investors
whether they invest directly or through a U.S. RIC, especially to the extent
the RIC earns foreign source income. The infirmities of the statute are even
more apparent when comparing the U.S. tax burdens of foreign investors in
a RIC with those of an investment partnership that earns the same income
as the RIC. The lack of discussion in the legislative history for excluding
foreign source income from look-through treatment is especially surprising.
Prior to the enactment of the foreign mutual fund provisions, similar
bills had been introduced in Congress, and these bills provided that foreign
source interest income that was exempt from foreign tax without regard to
115
any U.S. treaty provision would be treated as qualified interest income.

113

In computing ICTI, a RIC is not allowed to deduct net operating losses. I.R.C. §
852(b)(2)(B). Consequently, the excess of investment expenses over investment income does
not provide a current or deferred tax benefit to RIC shareholders. Since such expenses
reduce a RIC’s net asset value (NAV), however, a RIC shareholder who sells its shares will
realize a tax benefit because its amount realized will decrease.
114
For an overview of typical hedge fund compensation, see DONALD J. MARPLES,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY
MANAGERS (2007). A common practice for fund managers is to waive the management fee
in exchange for an increased share of fund profits and thereby convert ordinary income into
LTCGs. See Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX
NOTES 743 (Feb. 9, 2009). The IRS issued proposed regulations in 2015 aimed at requiring
income from many types of fee waivers to be treated as disguised payments for services
under section 707(a)(2)(A). REG-115452-14, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,652 (July 23, 2015). A fee
waiver that is treated as additional distributable share of partnership income to the fund
manager in a fund that generates FDAP income would benefit a foreign investor because a
nondeductible expense (the 1% fee) would be converted, via a reduction in the investor’s
share of FDAP income, into a deduction.
115
See supra note 67.
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This provision, which was omitted in the final legislation, suggests the
policy rationale for excluding foreign source income from look-through
treatment may have been to prevent third-country foreign investors from
obtaining U.S. treaty benefits with respect to foreign source income by
116
investing in a U.S. RIC.
The tax treaty issues raised by cross-border
investment by RICs with U.S. and foreign investors are addressed next.
IV. RICS AND TREATIES
This section examines the treatment of mutual funds under tax treaties.
It focuses first on the current treatment of RICs under treaties and the recent
OECD efforts to accommodate mutual funds in tax treaties. It then
discusses how the exclusion for pass-through treatment of foreign source
income was primarily intended to prevent third-country foreign investors in
U.S. RICs from availing themselves of U.S. treaty benefits and how this
concern is exaggerated.
One of the primary goals of tax treaties is to eliminate (or mitigate)
double taxation, or the taxation of an item of income by both the source and
117
residence countries. Treaties use various mechanisms to accomplish this
goal. For investment income, the relevant provisions reduce or eliminate
118
source basis taxation of interest, dividends, royalties, and capital gains.
By reducing source basis taxation, the residence country’s tax receipts are
generally increased since the residence country’s credit for source basis

116

See Staffaroni, supra note 17, at 533.
Tax treaties are officially captioned as conventions for the avoidance of double
taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital
gains. See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], MODEL TAX CONVENTION
ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION, para. 2 (2014) [hereinafter OECD Model
Treaty] (noting that the main purpose of the OECD Model Treaty is to “clarify, standardize,
and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers . . . through the application by all countries of
common solutions to identical cases of double taxation.”).
118
See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art. 2,
para. 1, July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,161 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Treaty] (prohibiting the
source country from taxing interest); id. art. 13, para. 5 (prohibiting the source country from
taxing gains other than gains from real property); id. art. 12 (prohibiting the source country
from taxing royalties); id. art. 10 (limiting the source country’s taxation of dividends to a
maximum rate of 15%, 5%, or 0% depending on recipient’s ownership percentage). In
addition, under the “Other Income” article, investment income that does not fall under one of
the previous categories, such as swap income, is only taxable in the state of residence. Id.
art. 22, para. 1 (prohibiting the source country from taxing “other income”).
117
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119

taxation will decrease.
Pass-through or conduit entities present multiple treaty policy
challenges. An assumption underlying treaty provisions is that when a
source country reduces source basis taxation on an item of income, the
residence country will tax that item. For conduits, this is not necessarily the
case. If income arising in the source country is not taxed by the residence
country either because the resident country recipient is tax-exempt or not
subject to tax because it is a pass-through entity, the source country may
argue that it does not have to relieve source basis taxation under a treaty
120
because there is no possibility of double taxation. Since the income of a
pure pass-through entity is taxed at the owner level and not at the entity
level, should the residence of the entity that earned the income or the
residence of the entity’s owner determine treaty benefits?
A sine qua non of being a resident eligible for treaty benefits is being
121
liable to tax.
Since a RIC avoids entity-level tax to the extent it
distributes its income and capital gains, it could be argued that a RIC is not
subject to tax and therefore should not be eligible for treaty benefits. If a
RIC is eligible for treaty benefits, but can pass the source and character of
all of its income through to its shareholders, there is a concern that foreign
investors that are residents of a country without a treaty with the source
country could invest in a U.S. RIC and indirectly garner treaty benefits that
they could not otherwise obtain had they invested directly in the RIC’s
underlying securities.
Both the United States and the OECD focused on the similar issue of
122
the treaty treatment of partnerships and partners during the 1990s
and
119

This is also true in the case of a country that does not permit a resident to credit
source basis taxes because after-tax cash is increased.
120
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMMENTARIES ON THE ARTICLES
OF THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION, para. 5, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL (2010) [hereinafter OECD Commentary] (“Where, however, a partnership is treated
as fiscally transparent in a State, the partnership is not ‘liable to tax’ in that State . . . and so
cannot be a resident . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, at 9 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. Technical Explanation]
(“entities that are fiscally transparent in the country in which their owners are resident are
not considered to be resident of a Contracting State (although income derived by such
entities may be taxed as the income of a resident, if taxed in the hands of resident partners or
other owners).”).
121
U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 13.
122
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION, NO. 6 THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION TO
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amended their respective model treaties to address issues arising from the
123
receipt of income by fiscally transparent (pass-through) entities.
Additionally, in 1997, the United States enacted section 894(c), which
denies a foreign person treaty benefits for income derived through a
partnership if (1) the income is not treated as income of the foreign person
under foreign law, (2) the treaty does not specifically address pass-through
entities, and (3) the foreign country does not tax a distribution of such
124
income from the entity to the person.
As a result of these changes, a
partnership is not generally eligible for treaty benefits; instead, a partner is
potentially eligible for treaty benefits to the extent that partner is taxed on
his or her share of the partnership’s income, as determined under the laws
125
of the partner’s country of residence.
Thus, each foreign partner must
demonstrate his or her entitlement to treaty benefits.
The United States has pursued a different policy for RICs. U.S. treaty
policy over the last twenty years has been to treat U.S. RICs as treaty
residents. Not all countries, however, have adopted the same policy. In
response to the significant increase in assets invested globally by
investment companies — denominated in treaty argot as collective
126
investment vehicles (CIVs)
— the OECD published in 2009 detailed
127
studies of the treaty issues raised by cross-border investments by CIVs.
PARTNERSHIPS (1999).
123
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION
OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 1, para. 6 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty], https:// www.
treasury.gov/ press-center/ press-releases/ Documents/ hp16801. pdf; OECD Commentary,
supra note 120 (the partnership amendments are primarily found in paras. 2–6.7).
124
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1054(a), 111 Stat. 788, 943;
I.R.C. § 894(c).
125
See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 1, para. 6.
126
The OECD limits CIVs “to funds that are widely-held, hold a diversified portfolio of
securities and are subject to investor-protection regulation in the country in which they are
established.” Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], The Granting of Treaty Benefits
with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles, para. 4 (May 31, 2010)
[hereinafter OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs], https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/45359261.pdf.
Under this definition, hedge funds and venture capital funds would not be CIVs.
127
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Rep. of the Informal Consultative
Group on the Taxation of Collective Investment Vehicles & Procedures for Tax Relief for
Cross-Border Investors on the Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of
Collective Investment Vehicles (Jan. 12, 2009), https:// www.oecd.org/ tax/ treaties/
41974553.pdf; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Rep. of the Informal
Consultative Group on the Taxation of Collective Investment Vehicles & Procedures for Tax
Relief for Cross-Border Investors on Possible Improvements to Procedures for Tax Relief
for Cross-Border Investors (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter OECD, Possible Improvements],
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The final 2010 report proposed changes to the Commentary on Article 1 of
128
the OECD Model that were subsequently adopted.
The OECD recently revisited the treaty treatment of CIVs as part of its
comprehensive program to develop international tax measures to combat
129
the shifting of profits by multinationals to low or no-tax locations. CIVs
130
are addressed in the measures focusing on treaty shopping.
The OECD
provided various possible provisions covering CIVs in its proposed
131
limitations on benefits article.
The proposals largely follow the
recommendations and conclusions in the 2010 CIV report, and it appears
132
the BEPS project will not recommend any additional modifications.
CIVs present distinct challenges for tax administrators to design rules
that neither impede cross-border investments by imposing multiples levels
of taxation on investment income nor encourage tax avoidance through
abusive treaty shopping. First, in some countries, CIVs are separate
corporate entities such as RICs, whereas in others, CIVs are trusts, and in

https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/41974569.pdf; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.
[OECD], The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective
Investment Vehicles, Public Discussion Draft (Dec. 9, 2009), https://www.oecd.org/fr/ctp/
conventions/44211901.pdf; OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126.
128
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], The 2010 Update to the Model Tax
Convention, at 4–12 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter OECD, Model Commentary],
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/45689328.pdf (adding new paragraphs 6.8 to 6.34 to the
Commentary on Article 1). The subject of the taxation of cross border investment funds has
long been the focus of international practitioners and the OECD. See Patricia A. Brown,
Fifty Years of Tax Uncertainty: The Problem of International Neutrality for Collective
Investment Vehicles, in THE TAX TREATMENT OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 19, 19–22 (Hein Vermeulen ed., 2013).
129
The OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) program is presented in ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (2013) [hereinafter BEPS Action Plan].
130
Id.
131
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF
TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, at 41–46 (2014) (discussing the CIV
provisions in the proposed limitation-on-benefits (LOB) article). This draft was further
revised in Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Revised Discussion Draft, BEPS
Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, at 7–8 (May 22, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties
/revised-discussion-draft-beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf.
132
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Revised Discussion Draft, BEPS
Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, at 8 (May 22, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties
/revised-discussion-draft-beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf. The OECD proposals to
limit treaty shopping by CIVs are discussed infra Part IV.E.
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133

others they are joint ownership vehicles.
Some countries tax the CIV
itself whereas in others, the CIV owners are taxed on their share of the
CIV’s income whether or not it is distributed. Tax transparency — a single
level of tax on the CIV’s income — is achieved in various ways, such as
outright exemption of the CIV’s income or de facto exemption through
134
deductions for distributions as in the case of RICs. While many issues of
international taxation involve two countries — the source country (where
the income arises) and the residence country (where the owner of the
income is resident) — CIVs may involve three or more countries: the
source country, the country where the CIV is formed, and the country
135
where the CIV owner is resident. Finally, for CIV income that is subject
to source basis taxation, various mechanisms could be used to relieve
double taxation, but many raise significant administrative burdens for
funds, their investors, and tax administrators.
Given the disparate national approaches to taxing CIVs and their
owners, the OECD did not proffer a definitive solution for the treatment of
CIVs under treaties. The CIV amendments to the Commentary on Article 1
of the Model Treaty establish a consensus position for many important
treaty issues, lay the groundwork for resolving other issues, and will, at the
least, be an important impetus to treaty negotiators to explicitly consider
and address in negotiating new treaties or modifying existing treaties. They
are also generally consistent with U.S. RIC treaty policy.
A. Are RICs Residents Under Treaties?
Treaties provide benefits only to “persons” that are “residents” of the
136
signatory countries to a treaty.
A person includes a “company,” and a
company is “any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes
137
according to the laws of the state in which it is organized.” Since a RIC
must be a U.S. corporation, it would certainly be considered a person for
138
U.S. treaty purposes.
This policy is consistent with the CIV Benefits

133

OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, paras. 21–23.
134
See Brown, supra note 128, at 26 (summarizing five models for fund taxation).
135
If the CIV is acquired through an intermediary, such as a bank or securities firm,
there could be four or more countries involved.
136
See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 1, para. 1 (“This Convention shall
apply only to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States, except as
otherwise provided in the Convention.”).
137
Id. art. 3, para. 1(b).
138
See I.R.C. § 851(a) (“[T]he term ‘[RIC]’ means any domestic corporation . . . .”).
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Report, which concludes that a CIV should qualify as a person for treaty
purposes if it is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes but not if it is
139
merely a form of joint ownership.
A resident is a person who is “liable to tax” by reason of, inter alia, its
place of incorporation. The tax policy of the United States for the last
twenty years has been to treat RICs not as fiscally transparent like
partnerships but instead as corporate entities liable to tax, even though
almost virtually all RICs distribute annually all of their ICTI and NCGs and
140
thus pay no U.S. tax.
The rationale for this policy is that RICs will be
liable to tax if they do not satisfy certain distribution, organization, and
141
investment requirements. All recent U.S. treaties ensure that U.S. RICs
142
are treaty residents.

139

OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, para. 25. The treatment of trusts is
unclear. In common law countries, trusts are generally recognized as persons and entitled to
treaty benefits. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 1, para. 1(a) (“‘person’
includes . . . a trust . . . .”). In the United States, trusts are subject to tax but may deduct
certain amounts distributed to beneficiaries. See I.R.C. § 641 (subjecting a trust to tax on its
taxable income under section 1(e)). Some civil law countries, however, do not recognize
trusts. See Anna Nemenova, Tax Treatment of Trusts in Civil Law Countries and Application
of Double Tax Treaties to Trusts (Part I), 43 TAX PLAN. INT’L REV. 20, 21 (Mar. 2016).
140
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 20,
1996, at 13 (1996) (“[RICs and real estate investment trusts (REITS)] that are nominally
subject to tax but that in practice are rarely required to pay tax also would generally be
treated as residents and therefore accorded treaty benefits.”).
141
U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 13 (“Although the income earned by
[RICs] normally is not subject to U.S. tax in the hands of the entity, they are taxable to the
extent that they do not currently distribute their profits, and therefore may be regarded as
‘liable to tax.’ They also must satisfy a number of requirements under the Code in order to
be entitled to special tax treatment.”). See also Rev. Rul. 2000-59, 2000-2 C.B. 593
(concluding that investment entity subject to RIC-like tax regime was liable to tax under
treaties identical to 1996 Model Treaty but noting that the entity’s distributions to foreign
interest holders were subject to tax regardless of the source of the entity’s underlying
income).
The regulations under section 894 treat an entity as fiscally transparent if under the laws of
the entity’s jurisdiction an interest holder must take into account on a current basis its share
of the entity’s income, whether or not distributed to the interest holder, and the character
and source of the item of income are determined as if such item were realized directly from
the source which realized by the entity. Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2013)
(emphasis added). A RIC thus would not be treated as fiscally transparent.
142
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE
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The “liable to tax” criterion was especially challenging for the OECD
because of the disparate domestic approaches to taxing CIVs and their
owners. Domestic legislation generally aims to impose similar tax burdens
on the income of CIV investors whether it is earned directly or indirectly.
As the CIV Benefits Report states: “Thus, the intent is to ensure neutrality
between direct investments and investments through a CIV, at least when
the investors, the CIV and the investment are all located in the same
143
country.”
One aspect of neutrality is that a CIV’s income be subject to only one
level of tax, which is achieved by various methods. Some countries treat
CIVs as fiscally transparent, like U.S. partnerships, whereas others
nominally tax a CIV’s income but permit a deduction for distributions to
the CIV owners, as is the case of RICs. Some countries tax a CIV’s income
at a low rate or provide for exemption of the CIV’s income in the investors’
144
hands or permit imputation of the CIV taxes paid at the owner level.
The CIV Benefits Report concludes that a CIV will be a resident
provided that it is potentially liable to tax even if a CIV does not actually
pay tax, because, for instance, the CIV can deduct distributions in
145
determining its taxable income.
If, however, a CIV is actually exempt
from tax or fiscally transparent, it will not qualify as a resident. This
approach is consistent with U.S. tax policy. Not all countries, however,
agree that CIVs satisfy the liable-to-tax criterion since CIVs are specifically
146
structured so that they do not pay tax and very few actually pay tax.

AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT
TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS 16 (2013) [hereinafter “U.S.-U.K. Technical
Explanation”].
143
OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, para. 27.
144
Id. para. 28.
145
Id. paras. 29–30 (treating a CIV as opaque and as a resident subject to tax even if it
receives a deduction for dividends paid to investors, but noting that some countries do not
view such an entity as being “liable to tax”). This conclusion is consistent with paragraph
8.5 of the Commentary to the OECD Model. Id. para. 30.
The CIV Benefits Report also addresses whether a CIV is the beneficial owner of its income,
that is, whether ownership in a CIV is equivalent to ownership of the underlying assets. Id.
paras. 31–35. If it were not, the CIV would not be eligible for treaty benefits with respect to
its income. Id. para. 31. The CIV Benefits Report concludes that a CIV is the beneficiary of
its income because “[t]he investor has no right to the underlying assets. . . . [I]t is the
manager of the CIV that has discretionary powers to manage the assets on behalf of the
holders of interests in the CIV.” Id. paras. 32–33.
146
See, e.g., Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to ByungCheol Kim, Dir. Corp. Tax Div., Korean Ministry of Strategy and Fin. (Apr. 13, 2012),
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Once a CIV qualifies as resident, it is highly likely that it will be
eligible for treaty benefits. In contrast, if RICs were subject to the treaty
rules for partnerships, each RIC shareholder would have to qualify
separately for treaty benefits. Given the great number of shareholders in a
typical RIC, this would be an administrative nightmare, and many
shareholders, especially those with small investments, would simply forego
147
claiming treaty benefits because of the cost and administrative burdens.
In addition, this policy obviates the need to attempt to assign source basis
taxes imposed on a RIC’s income to a particular shareholder when the RIC
distributes the income.
The concept of neutrality, however, has its limits. True neutrality is
achieved only if a CIV’s income is subject to a single level of tax and the
character of its income passes through to its owners. The CIV Benefits
Report does not focus on the character of a CIV’s income in the hands of its
owners. The drafters may have been concerned that by insisting on passthrough treatment of the character of the income, it would have been
difficult to distinguish between partnerships and CIVs.
B. Are RICs Qualified Persons Under Treaties?
In all U.S. treaties negotiated within the last thirty years, a resident
under Article 4 must also generally be a “qualified person” under the
148
Limitation of Benefits (LOB) article to be eligible for treaty benefits.
The LOB article is intended to prevent treaty shopping, that is, the use of an
entity formed in one of the signatory countries to receive income or transact
business in the other signatory country but that is owned by (or whose
income is substantially attributable to) residents of a third country that does

https://www.ici.org/pdf/26044.pdf. The U.S.-Korea treaty was signed in 1976 and does not
specifically address RICs. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of
International Trade and Investment, U.S.-Korea, June 4, 1976, 30 U.S.T. 5253.
147
If a taxpayer is eligible to claim treaty benefits to reduce source basis taxes but
elects not to, he may not claim a credit for the foreign taxes that could have been reduced or
refunded, since the foreign taxes may be treated as a “noncompulsory amount” under Treas.
Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(i) (as amended in 2013).
148
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, paras. 1–2. Some older U.S.
treaties do not contain an LOB provision. See Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Tax Planning with U.S.
Income Tax Treaties Without LOB Provisions, 36 TAX MGM’T. INT’L J. 123 (2007); Jeffrey
L. Rubinger, Treaty Shopping: Is it Still a Viable Option?, May 2007 CORP. BUS. TAX’N
MONTHLY 15, 17 (noting that there are twelve treaties without LOB provisions).
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149

not have a treaty with the United States. All modern U.S. treaties include
a detailed LOB provision, but many of our trading partners do not share the
same restrictive view of treaty shopping. The rationale for expansive LOB
provisions is to limit the unilateral bestowal of treaty benefits on thirdcountry residents and thereby encourage these countries to enter into
treaties with the United States so that the United States too can obtain
benefits for its residents.
How a RIC would be a “qualified person” under an LOB article is not
150
entirely clear, and the inquiry has not received much commentary.
A
U.S. corporation may be a qualified person in various ways. First, a U.S.
corporation is a qualified person if the principal class of its shares is
151
regularly traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges. The LOB
article treats a U.S. corporation as satisfying the LOB provisions if, inter
152
alia, the corporation is publicly traded in the United States. Closed-end
funds and ETFs should generally qualify as publicly traded. Open-end RICs
would probably not satisfy the publicly traded exception since the shares
153
are not publicly traded on one or more U.S. stock exchanges.
Another basis on which a U.S. corporation can be a qualified person is
pursuant to the so-called base-ownership and base-erosion tests. These tests
are satisfied if a U.S. corporation is 50%-or-more owned (by vote) by
qualified persons for at least half of the taxable year and less than 50% of
the corporation’s gross income is paid in the form of deductible payments

149

U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 63 (“Article 22 contains antitreaty-shopping provisions that are intended to prevent residents of third countries from
benefiting from what is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries.”). The
third country owners could be residents of a country that has a treaty with the source country
but the terms of which are less favorable than the treaty in which the entity is formed.
150
See Brown, supra note 128, at 34 n. 26.
151
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 2(c)(i). The criteria for
“regularly traded” and “recognized stock exchange” can be found in paragraph 7 of the LOB
article. See id. paras. 7(a) (defining recognized stock exchanges), 7(e) (defining shares as
regularly traded if 6% or more of the average shares outstanding are traded on the applicable
exchange during the prior taxable year).
152
See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 2(c).
153
For the United States, a recognized state exchange includes NASDAQ and any stock
exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. U.S. Model Treaty,
supra note 123, art. 22, para. 5(a). In actual treaties, this clause is typically drafted so that a
U.S. company is a qualified person where its shares are traded and not where they are
registered. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 2(c)(i).
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to persons who are not residents of the United States or the other signatory
154
country.
Probably all U.S. RICs satisfy the base-ownership prong given that
foreign investors likely constitute a small percentage of RIC’s
155
shareholders.
If, however, shares of a RIC are held through
intermediaries such as brokerage houses, it is impossible to know with
156
certainty whether the RIC satisfies the base-ownership prong.
If a RIC satisfies the base ownership test, it likely also satisfies the
157
base erosion test. First, since open-end RICs cannot issue debt securities,
a RIC could not adjust its capital structure so that significant portions of its
income could be paid to non-treaty residents in the form of tax-deductible
interest. But since distributions of NCG, ICTI, and tax-exempt interest are
deductible, such distributions would probably be treated as deductible
payments for purposes of the base erosion test. Given that a RIC generally
158
has only one class of stock and no non-bank debt, and a RIC distributes
154

U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 2(e). For these purposes, a U.S.
person includes a U.S. individual, federal, state or local government, or publicly traded U.S.
company. Id. art. 3, para. 1(a). The aim of the second prong of this test is to prevent
nontreaty residents from capitalizing a company organized in a treaty country with a
significant amount of debt (held by the nontreaty residents) and a small of amount of equity
held by qualified persons. If the debt were substantial, a company could pay out its income
as deductible interest to the nontreaty debt holders.
155
In a recent submission to the Korean government, the Investment Company Institute
stated that RICs are generally owned “almost exclusively by U.S. investors” because of the
unfavorable tax treatment of foreign investors and the fact that RICs are almost never
registered for sale outside of the United States. See Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior
Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to Byung-Cheol Kim, Dir. Corp. Tax Div., Korean Ministry of
Strategy and Fin., supra note 146, app. at 3.
156
For a discussion, see U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES 10–11 (Apr. 2015). The same issue arises
in the case of tax-exempt shareholders such as IRAs that invest in a fund through an
intermediary. See Colon, supra note 18, at 830 n. 248.
157
15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a). However, open-end companies may borrow directly from a
bank to finance a portion of their portfolio purchases. Id. § 80a-18(f)(1) (an open-end
company may not directly issue debt securities, but it may borrow from a bank if
immediately after such borrowing, the company has an asset coverage of at least 300%).
Closed-end funds may issue debt securities and preferred stock under limited circumstances,
in addition to borrowing from banks to fund portfolio purchases. Id. § 80a-18(a)(1)
(requiring that immediately after such issuance of debt, a fund have asset coverage of at least
300%); id. § 80a-18(a)(2) (requiring that immediately after such issuance of preferred stock,
a fund have asset coverage of at least 200%).
158
Prior to 2010, a RIC generally had to distribute dividends pro rata. See I.R.C. §
562(c). This rule was repealed for publicly offered RICs in The Regulated Investment
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generally all of its income, if qualified persons hold 50% of the votes, it
generally will not be possible for 50% or more of the RIC’s gross income to
be paid to persons who are not residents of the U.S. or the other signatory
159
country. Given that many open-end RICs have currently begun to limit
sales of shares to non-U.S. residents, whether a RIC is a qualified person
under the base erosion/ownership tests may become an increasingly moot
160
issue.
Finally, many recent U.S. treaties permit the competent authorities of
each country to agree to grant treaty benefits with respect to an item of
income if it is determined that the “establishment, acquisition or
maintenance” of the entity “and the conduct of its operations did not have
161
as one of its principal purposes the obtaining of [treaty] benefits.” Given

Company Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-325, § 307(a), 124 Stat. 3537, 3550.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 contains limitations on the capital structure of an
open-end RIC. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1)–(2).
159
Since gross income is income reduced by expenses, and a RIC’s income is generally
distributed proportionately to share holdings, third country residents could never receive
more than 50% of the RIC income (which is less than gross income) without owning more
than 50% of the payor RIC. The base erosion test was certainly not envisioned to apply to an
entity like a RIC that deducts payments to equity holders. Apparently treaty benefits have
not been denied for failure to qualify under an LOB provision. See Brown, supra note 128,
at 34 n. 26.
160
See, e.g., Laura Saunders, Fidelity Bans U.S. Investors Overseas From Buying
Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Jul. 1, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
fidelity-bans-overseas-investors-from-buying-mutual-funds-1404246385.
In
informal
conversations with the author, professionals in the industry have stated that funds have
begun to restrict sales to foreign residents because of the concern that such sales could be
treated as a public offering under foreign law.
There are other ways a company can be eligible for treaty benefits even if it is not a
qualified person, but these will generally not apply to RICs. Under the equivalent
beneficiary provision, a company will be entitled to treaty benefits if, inter alia, 95% or more
of a company’s shares are owned directly or indirectly by seven or fewer persons who are
equivalent beneficiaries. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 3(a). A
RIC would not qualify under this provision because of the large number of its shareholders.
This provision is discussed infra Part. V.D. Even if the recipient of an item of income is not
a qualified person under the LOB article, the resident can obtain treaty benefits if he is
engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in the residence country and the income
derived in the source state is “is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, that trade or
business.” U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 3. A RIC cannot qualify under
this provision because the business of making or managing investments for its own account
is excluded unless the activities are banking, insurance, or securities activities carried on by
a bank, insurance company, or registered securities dealer. Id.
161
U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 4.
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the significant regulatory burdens imposed on U.S. RICs, if an open-end
U.S. RIC were to become majority-owned by foreign investors who are not
treaty residents, the RIC should be able to show that it was not established
or maintained to obtain treaty benefits. Furthermore, if an open-end RIC
permits any foreign investor to acquire shares, the RIC should be able to
show that the acquisition did not have a principal purpose of obtaining
treaty benefits. A RIC established solely for the non-treaty investors,
however, might be problematic. There are no published rulings on the
criteria that competent authorities apply to make this determination in the
case of an investment company.
If a RIC is treated as a qualified person under an income tax treaty, it is
entitled to treaty benefits with respect to dividends, interest, and capital
gains arising in the source country. The maximum dividend rate generally
depends on the RIC’s ownership interest in the distributing corporation.
Tax treaties generally limit dividend source basis taxation to 15%, but this
rate is reduced to 5% if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a company
that owns 10% or more of voting power of the company paying the
162
dividend.
In recent treaties, the United States generally negotiates to
include a 0% rate if the dividend recipient is a pension or a company that
owns 80% or more of the voting power of the company paying the
163
dividend. It is highly unlikely that a RIC would qualify for the 0% rate
164
because of the tax and securities law diversification requirements.
In addition to a reduced treaty rate on dividends, if a RIC were a
qualified person for treaty purposes, any interest that was subject to source
basis taxation in the absence of a treaty would likely be tax-exempt in the
hands of the RIC, as most treaties generally provide for a 0% rate on source
165
basis interest.
Finally, any capital gains or derivatives income that is
166
otherwise subject to source basis taxation is generally exempt.

162

U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 10, para. 2.
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, paras. 3(a)–(b).
164
The reason is that investments in any one issuer above a certain percentage of a
fund’s assets or the issuer’s voting shares are not counted for purposes of the diversification
tests of a mutual fund. See I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)–(B).
165
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 11, para. 1 (interest is only taxable
in state of residence). Some few treaties permit source basis taxation of interest. See
Rubinger, Tax Planning with U.S. Income Tax Treaties Without LOB Provisions, supra note
148, n.18.
166
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 13, para. 5 (gains other than gains
from real property are only taxable in the residence country); art. 22 (other income, which
includes income from derivatives, is exempt from source basis taxation).
163

522

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 35:483

C. Special U.S. Treaty Rules for RIC Dividends
The above analysis has focused on whether a RIC is a qualified person
for purposes of a tax treaty. Although U.S. treaty policy has not explicitly
focused on the issue of whether a U.S. RIC is a qualified person, recent
U.S. treaties have included special provisions that apply to dividends paid
by a RIC to a foreign treaty resident. These provisions prevent a foreign
investor from exploiting a RIC’s quasi pass-through regime and garnering a
reduced rate on dividends paid by a RIC that it could not otherwise obtain if
it invested directly in the RIC’s assets.
167
In treaties containing these special provisions,
the 15% and 0%
dividend rates apply to dividends paid by RICs only in limited
circumstances. Under the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty, a foreign RIC
shareholder is not entitled to the 5% dividend rate regardless of the
shareholder’s ownership percentage of the RIC; the 15% rate applies unless
168
the recipient is a pension plan, in which case the 0% rate applies.
The
Technical Explanation to the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty states that these
limitations are intended to prevent a treaty resident who desires to hold a
diversified U.S. portfolio from purchasing 10% or more of the shares of a
RIC holding a diversified U.S. portfolio, making the dividends paid by the
RIC subject to the 5% rate rather than the 15% rate that would apply if the
169
treaty resident invested directly in the underlying shares.
In actual tax treaties, the dividend limitation applies to entities
denominated “pooled investment vehicles” (PIVs). A PIV is a person
whose assets consist wholly or mainly of real estate or stock, securities,
currencies or derivatives, whose gross income consists wholly or mainly of
dividends, interest, capital gains, rents, and other income and gains from
real property, and who is either exempt from tax, subject to tax at a special
rate, or is entitled to a deduction for dividends in computing income or
170
171
gains. RICs are considered to be PIVs.
In the U.S.-U.K. treaty, for example, a dividend paid by a U.S. RIC (a
PIV under the treaty) to a U.K. resident is not eligible for the 5% rate,
regardless of the percentage of the RIC’s shares owned by the U.K.

167

All recent treaties contain this provision.
U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 10, para. 4(a). Special rules also apply to
dividends paid by REITs. Id. para. 4(a)(i)–(iii).
169
U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 36.
170
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, para. 10(b) (defining PIV).
171
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Technical Explanation, supra note 142, at 41.
168
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172

resident. A dividend paid by a RIC to a U.K. pension is eligible for the
0% rate, provided the RIC’s assets consist wholly or mainly of shares,
173
securities, currencies, or derivatives of such assets.
The Technical
Explanation to the U.S.-U.K. treaty echoes the justification given in the
U.S. Model Technical Explanation for the limitation of the 5% rate for U.K.
investors in U.S. RICs. The dividend rate limitation is designed to prevent a
passive U.K. investor from converting a 15% tax on U.S. source dividends
to a 5% tax by purchasing a 10% or greater interest in a RIC that holds a
174
diversified portfolio of U.S stocks.
The justification for this special treatment given in the U.S. Model
Technical Explanation and other treaties is somewhat questionable. The
U.K. Technical Explanation strangely equivocates when it states: “[i]f the
RIC is a pure conduit, there may be no U.S. tax costs to interposing the
175
RIC.” To the extent that a RIC holds only U.S. stocks and the RIC earns
only capital gains and U.S. source dividends, this statement is accurate, and
the provisions prevent converting the 15% tax on those dividends to 5%.
But as a description of a RIC’s fiscal taxonomy under current law, a RIC is
not a pure conduit for either U.S. or foreign investors, especially with
respect to a RIC’s foreign source income. Since a RIC is not a pure conduit,
there are tax costs to interposing the RIC for foreign source income: the
RIC’s foreign source income that would otherwise be exempt from U.S. tax
now becomes subject to a 15% tax for treaty investors.
Finally, it is somewhat strange that recent treaties treat payments by

172

U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, para. 4, amended by Protocol Amending
the Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital Gains, Signed At London on 24th July 2001, U.S.-U.K., art. II, July 19, 2002,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,161.
173
Id. The provisions dealing with REITs follow the 2006 Treaty Model and limit the
availability of the 15% rate (for nonpensions) and 0% (for pensions). Id.
174
U.S.-U.K. Technical Explanation, supra note 142, at 42.
175
Id. This same rationale is found in other treaties, although its formulation differs
slightly. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION TO THE
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION
OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS SIGNED AT
DUBLIN ON JULY 28, 1997, AND THE PROTOCOL SIGNED AT DUBLIN ON JULY 28, 1997, art. 10
(1997) (“Since the RIC may be a pure conduit, there may be no U.S. tax costs to interposing
the RIC in the chain of ownership.”). The special rule for withholding rates on dividends
paid by RICs and REITs is contained in thirty-seven U.S. income tax treaties.
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PIVs specially and all note that RICs are PIVs, but there is no discussion of
how a RIC or PIV is a qualified person under the LOB article. Perhaps the
drafters rely on an unstated assumption that nonpublicly traded RICs are
qualified persons because they would likely satisfy the base ownership and
base erosion tests.
D. Treaty Shopping and Foreign Investors
Unlike the U.S. Model Treaty, the OECD Model Treaty does not
contain a separate LOB article, as many countries have not historically
176
shared the same concern with treaty shopping as the United States. The
OECD’s recent BEPS project is firm evidence that this laissez-faire attitude
177
is certainly on the wane. Treaty shopping refers generally to the strategy
employed by a resident of a country that does not have an income tax treaty
with the source country (the country of origin of interest, dividends, gains,
etc.) to obtain treaty benefits by using an entity formed in a country with
178
which the source country has a treaty. If the country in which the entity
is formed has a benign tax regime for extracting source country income,
e.g., a dividend exemption system or lax rules on income stripping, a
foreign investor from a non-treaty country can significantly improve his or
her after-tax returns by investing through a treaty-qualified entity. By
excluding all foreign source income from qualifying as qualified interest or
dividend income in the final foreign RIC legislation, Congress ensured that
all foreign source income would be subject to an additional 30% U.S. tax
when distributed (or less if a foreign shareholder’s country of residence had
a treaty with the United States), whether or not the RIC’s foreign source
income actually benefits from a U.S. treaty.
Because RICs do not pay tax on their distributed income, they could
176

The OECD Model Commentary to article 1 discusses possible approaches to treaty
shopping, including adopting a LOB provision similar to the typical U.S. LOB treaty
provisions. OECD Model Commentary, supra note 120, para. 20.
177
See BEPS Action Plan, supra note 129.
178
It also describes a situation where an investor is from a country that has a treaty with
the source country but uses an entity formed in a country that has more favorable treaty
provisions with the source country than the residence treaty. For example, if under the
investor’s treaty with the source country, the dividend rate is 15%, but under the treaty of a
third country, the rate is 10%, it may be advantageous to interpose an entity formed in the
third country to make investments in the source country. This structure is dependent on
being able to extract the income from the third country with little or no additional tax
imposed by the third country or being able to receive a credit against residence taxation for
any tax imposed by the third country.
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potentially be vehicles for treaty shopping. The CIV Benefits Report
179
focuses extensively on this issue,
which is arguably the key to
understanding why the foreign RIC provisions do not provide look-through
for foreign source income.
CIVs with foreign investors present a formidable challenge for treaty
policy. It is difficult to accommodate under the current international tax
regime the competing goals to tax CIV investors, both foreign and
domestic, under domestic law on the same basis as if they had earned their
share of the CIV’s underlying income (a pass-through approach), but also to
treat CIVs as treaty residents with access to reduced treaty rates on their
foreign source income (an entity approach). The combination of these two
policies can result in a foreign investor being able to achieve a lower rate
(or zero rate) on a CIV’s foreign source income than he could obtain if he
invested directly. The desire of the United States to prevent treaty shopping
probably leads it to reject a look-through approach for a RIC’s foreign
source income. As demonstrated below, however, this concern is probably
exaggerated, and foreign investment in global RICs is unnecessarily
discouraged.
To focus on how these conflicts arise, assume two investors, one U.S.
and one foreign, each owning 50% of the shares of a RIC that earns $100 of
foreign source interest and $100 of foreign source dividends. The RIC
distributes all of its ICTI. The foreign source interest is not subject to
withholding by the source country (as is typical for most portfolio-type
interest), but dividends are subject to a 30% withholding tax unless reduced
by a treaty. When a treaty applies to a dividend, the withholding tax is 15%.
The following scenarios compare the tax consequences of earning
foreign source investment income through a RIC and earning the same
income directly (or equivalently through a partnership), and take treaties
into account. For income earned through a RIC, the relevant treaties are the
treaty between the source country and the United States and the treaty
between the foreign shareholder’s country of residence and the United
States. For income earned directly, the relevant treaty is that between the
foreign investor’s country of residence and the source country. Finally, for
each scenario below, it is assumed that if the RIC makes the section 853
election, the foreign shareholder is only taxed on the dividend actually
180
received and not the dividend grossed up for foreign taxes.

179

OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, paras. 52–57.
I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A). If foreign shareholders are taxed on a RIC’s foreign taxes, the
analysis does not change. In fact, there is an even greater disparity between the tax
180
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1. Scenario 1: No Treaty Applies
In the absence of any tax treaty, the RIC’s income is $200 and the
source country withholds $30 (30%*$100). If the RIC elects not to pass
through the foreign taxes but instead deduct them, each shareholder
181
receives $85. If the RIC elects to pass through the foreign tax credit, the
foreign and U.S. shareholder receive an $85 dividend, but the U.S.
shareholder reports an additional $15 of income on which it can claim a
182
credit.
If the dividends received by the RIC are qualified dividends, the
dividend paid to the U.S. shareholder is taxed partially as ordinary income
183
and partially as qualified dividend income.
For the U.S. shareholder,
earning the foreign source income through the RIC leaves the shareholder
in roughly the same position had the shareholder earned directly his or her
share of the underlying income, provided the fund makes the foreign tax
184
credit election.
185
The foreign shareholder is taxed at 30% on the $85 RIC dividend,
leaving the shareholder with $59.5 on a pretax return of $100, which results
in an effective tax rate of 40.5% (($15+$25.5)/$100). Note, this rate is
higher than either the source country tax rate or the U.S. tax rate. This
results from treating the foreign taxes as a deduction at the RIC level, i.e.,
they reduce income distributed to the foreign shareholder.
If the foreign investor had earned the foreign source income directly, it
would have paid $15 (30%*$50) of taxes on the dividend and $0 on the

consequences of direct investment and investing through a RIC.
181
See supra note 62.
182
See I.R.C. § 853(a)(1); § 901(a).
183
I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(C)(ii) (qualified dividend is a dividend from stock readily tradable
on an established securities market in the United States). If the dividends are not qualified,
the entire RIC dividend is taxed as ordinary income.
184
See supra note 62. Even if the foreign tax rate on the dividend income (30%) is
higher than the shareholder’s U.S. rate, most U.S. shareholders should be able to credit the
entire $15, since the average rate on foreign source income is 15% (50%*30% + 50%*0%).
In foreign tax credit parlance, since all of the income is in same basket, the passive basket, it
is possible to average the foreign taxes. Since a RIC can deduct investment expenses against
ICTI, see I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A), a RIC shareholder may be slightly better off earning income
through a RIC since those expenses could probably not be deducted if the shareholder
incurred them directly. See supra Part II.B.
185
See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (taxing U.S. source FDAP income of nonresident aliens at
30% tax); I.R.C. § 881(a) (taxing U.S. source FDAP income of foreign corporations at 30%
tax).
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interest, leaving $85 after-tax income, which is an effective tax rate of 15%.
If, however, the foreign investor’s country of residence had a treaty with the
source country, the withholding tax would have been reduced to $7.5
(15%*$50).
2. Scenario 2: U.S. Treaty Applies to Source Country Income
In this scenario, the United States has a treaty with the source country,
but the residence country does not have a treaty with either the United
States or the source country. The RIC’s source basis taxes are reduced from
$30 to $15 (15%*$100), and each investor receives $92.5. If the RIC elects
to pass through the foreign taxes, the U.S. investor will have income of
$100, but may claim a foreign tax credit of $7.5. Again, the U.S. investor is
roughly in the same after-tax position had he or she earned the foreign
source income directly.
The foreign shareholder is taxed at 30% on the $92.5 RIC dividend
leaving $64.75, which results in an effective tax rate of 35.25%
(($7.5+$27.75)/$100). Again, this rate is higher than either the source
country tax rate (15%) or the U.S. tax rate (30%) because the source taxes
reduce the RIC dividend paid to the foreign shareholder.
If the foreign investor had earned the foreign source income directly,
he or she would have paid $15 (30%*$50) of taxes on the dividend and $0
on the interest, leaving $85 of after-tax income. If, however, the foreign
investor’s country of residence had a treaty with the source country, the
withholding tax would have been reduced to $7.5 (15%*$50).
3. Scenario 3: U.S. Treaty Applies to Source and Residence Country
Income
In this scenario, the United States has a treaty both with the source
country and the foreign investor’s country of residence. This reduces the
dividend rate to 15%, and each investor receives a RIC dividend of $92.5. If
the RIC elects to pass through the foreign taxes, the U.S. investor is taxed
on $100, but receives a foreign tax credit of $7.5. The U.S. investor is
roughly in the same after-tax position had he or she earned the foreign
source income directly.
The foreign investor pays tax of $13.88 (15%*$92.5) on the RIC
dividend leaving $78.63, which results in an effective tax rate of 21.38%
(($7.5+$13.88)/$100). As in the previous examples, this rate is higher than
either the foreign or U.S. tax rate because the foreign taxes are in essence
deducted at the RIC level rather than credited at the investor level.
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In the absence of a treaty with the source country and in the case of
direct investment, the foreign investor would have paid $15 (30%*$50) of
taxes on the dividend and $0 on the interest, leaving $85 after-tax income.
If the foreign investor’s country of residence had a treaty with the source
country, the withholding tax would have been reduced to $7.5 (15%*$50).
186
Table 1
summarizes and compares the tax consequences to the
foreign investor of investing through a RIC and earning the foreign source
income directly.
TABLE 1

SCENARIO 1

RIC
SCENARIO 2

SCENARIO 3

DIRECT
NO TREATY

TREATY

FS DIV & INT
SOURCE WH
TAX

100

100

100

100

100

(15)

(7.5)

(7.5)

(15)

(7.5)

RIC INC
US WH TAX

85
(25.5)

92.5
(27.75)

92.5
(13.88)

ATCF
ETR

59.5
40.5%

64.75
35.25%

78.6
21.38%

85
15%

92.5
7.5%

187

For treaty shopping to be a viable strategy,
the total taxes paid to
both the source country and intermediate country (in this example, the
United States) must be less than the source country taxes that the investor
would have paid if he or she had earned the source country income directly
(or through a partnership). Because the United States taxes a RIC’s foreign
source income when distributed to a foreign investor, the foreign investor is
always worse off investing through a RIC than earning the foreign source
income directly.
In various bills that preceded the enactment of the foreign RIC
186

In the following tables, “FS Div & Int” refers to foreign source dividend and
interest; “ATCF” refers to after-tax cash flow; and “ETR” refers to effective tax rate.
187
The source country might view the granting of treaty benefits to a RIC with foreign
investors as a type of treaty shopping, especially in the case where the third-country investor
would not be entitled to treaty benefits if he or she invested directly. In such case, the source
country foregoes the 15% tax on source country dividends, but the U.S. gets the residual
15%, even though the dividends are paid to foreign investors. That is to say, had the thirdcountry investor earned the foreign source dividends directly, the source country would have
earned $15 of tax revenue. By a foreign investor investing indirectly through a RIC, the $15
tax is reduced to $7.5 because of the U.S. treaty, but the United States collects an additional
$6.375 of tax (if the third-country investor is treaty eligible) or an additional $12.75 (if the
third-country investor is not treaty eligible).
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provisions, foreign source interest income that was exempt from source
basis taxation without regard to a treaty would have constituted a qualified
interest dividend and therefore been exempt from U.S. tax when distributed
to a foreign investor. Under that approach, tax-exempt foreign source
income would have been eligible for look-through treatment and would
have been tax-exempt when paid by a RIC to a foreign investor. Other
foreign source income, however, would not have been eligible for lookthrough and would have been treated as a U.S. source dividend when
distributed.
The potential benefits to foreign investors if the United States had
adopted a look-through regime for foreign source income can be seen by
comparing the after-tax cash flows to a foreign investor in the above
scenarios with the after-tax cash flows a foreign investor would have earned
had the United States adopted complete look-through for foreign source
income. In the case of look-through treatment for foreign source income,
any dividend distributed, to the extent it was attributable to a RIC’s foreign
188
source income, would have been exempt.
In Scenario 1, where the foreign source dividend is taxed at 30% by the
source country, the RIC would receive $170 of after-tax foreign income,
and there would be no additional U.S. tax when it was distributed to a
foreign investor. The foreign investor would receive $85, the same amount
he or she would have received had the investor directly earned the source
country income. If, however, the foreign investor’s country of residence
had a treaty with the source country, the investor would end up with $92.5.
In Scenario 2, the source country would impose a 15% tax on the
$100 dividend paid to the RIC. When the RIC distributes $92.5 to the
foreign investor, there would be no additional U.S. tax. If the foreign
investor would have been entitled to treaty benefits with respect to the
source country dividend, the foreign investor would be in the same after-tax
position had he or she invested directly.
If, however, a foreign investor would not have been entitled to treaty
benefits for source country dividends had he or she invested directly, by
investing through the RIC, the foreign investor would succeed in using a
U.S. treaty to lower source basis taxes. In this scenario — full pass-through
treatment of foreign source income and investment in a RIC by a non-treaty
foreign investor — a foreign investor can use a U.S. treaty to obtain indirect

188

This also assumes that income earned by a RIC that is sourced by the residence of
the recipient, e.g., swap income, would be treated as if it were earned directly by the foreign
shareholders.
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benefits for which he or she would not be eligible if the investor had
invested directly (or through a partnership). This is a classic example of
189
treaty shopping.
The results in Scenario 3 are similar to Scenario 2: since there is no
U.S. tax on the RIC dividend, the existence of a U.S. treaty with the
residence country is irrelevant. Consequently, the foreign investor is in the
same after-tax cash position as if he or she invested directly with treaty
benefits. If the investor were not eligible for treaty benefits, investing
directly would leave him or her with less cash after-tax than investing
through a RIC.
Table 2 summarizes and compares the tax consequences to the foreign
investor of investing through a RIC under a full look-through regime with
directly earning the foreign source income. One can see the potential for
treaty shopping by comparing the after-tax cash flows in Scenario 2 with
the after-tax cash flows in a direct investment with no treaty scenario. By
investing through a RIC entitled to treaty benefits, a foreign investor
improves his or her after-tax cash position compared to when the investor
invests directly.
TABLE 2
SCENARIO 1

RIC
SCENARIO 2

SCENARIO 3

DIRECT
NO TREATY

TREATY

FS DIV & INT
SOURCE WH TAX

100
(15)

100
(7.5)

100
(7.5)

100
(15)

100
(7.5)

RIC INC
US WH TAX

85
0.0

92.5
0.0

92.5
0.0

ATCF
ETR

85.0
15.0%

92.50
7.5%

92.5
7.5%

85
15%

92.5
7.5%

Finally, it is instructive to compare the above results with the tax
consequences to a foreign investor had the foreign RIC provisions provided
look-through only for untaxed foreign source interest. This approach would
have eliminated the potential for treaty shopping for foreign source interest
earned through a RIC, because the interest income would be tax-free for a
189

This would also be the case if the foreign investor’s country of residence had a
treaty with the source country but the dividend rate was greater than the dividend rate under
the U.S. treaty with the source country. If foreign source income were passed through to a
foreign investor, there would be no additional U.S. tax when the foreign source income was
distributed by the RIC. The foreign investor would thus get the benefit of the lower U.S.
treaty rate on the foreign source income.
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foreign investor whether earned through a RIC or earned directly.
A
foreign investor would generally be worse off earning foreign dividends
through a RIC because of the additional layer of U.S. tax when the RIC
distributed the income. Thus, global fixed income RICs would have
benefitted under such a regime, but global equity RICs would have been
penalized.
To illustrate, in Scenario 1, where there is no source or residence
treaty, there would still be a source tax of $15 on the foreign dividend, but
the U.S. withholding tax would be reduced to $10.5 (($50-$15)*30%)
because the part of the dividend that was attributable to foreign source
interest would qualify as an IRD. The total taxes paid would be $25.5. In
contrast, a direct investment by a non-treaty foreign investor would
generate foreign taxes of $15 ($50*30%), and $7.5 ($50*15%) in the case
of a treaty investor.
In Scenario 2, where there is a U.S. treaty with the source country, the
RIC would receive $185 ($200 reduced by a 15% tax on a $100 dividend).
When the RIC distributes $92.5 to the foreign investor, the United States
would collect another $12.75 ($42.5*30%), for total foreign taxes of
$20.25. If the foreign investor had invested directly, he or she would have
paid source country tax of $15 ($50*30%) without a treaty and $7.5
($50*15%) with a treaty. Direct investment still dominates indirect
investment because there is U.S. tax imposed on the foreign source
dividend.
In Scenario 3, where there is a U.S. treaty with the residence country,
the RIC would receive $185 ($200 reduced by 15% tax on $100 dividend).
When the RIC distributes $92.5 to the foreign investor, the United States
would collect another $6.38 (15%*$42.5), for a total tax paid by the foreign
investor of $13.88. If the foreign investor had invested directly, he or she
would have paid source country tax of $15 (30% of $50 of dividend
income) without a treaty and $7.5 with a treaty.
Table 3 summarizes and compares the tax consequences to the foreign
investor of investing through a RIC under a look-through regime for taxexempt foreign source interest with earning the foreign source income
directly. Table 3 demonstrates that a foreign investor can improve his or her
190

In a submission to the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, the Investment Company Institute noted that this language would
“eliminate the U.S. withholding tax barrier to foreign investment in U.S. funds” while
limiting the potential for treaty shopping. Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 200 (1999)
(statement of the Investment Company Institute).
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after-tax cash flow by earning foreign source dividends through a RIC
where the foreign investor’s country of residence does not have a treaty
with the source country but has a treaty with the United States (and the
United States has a treaty with the source country).
TABLE 3

SCENARIO 1

RIC
SCENARIO 2

SCENARIO 3

DIRECT
NO TREATY

TREATY

FS DIV & INT
SOURCE WH TAX

100
(15)

100
(7.5)

100
(7.5)

100
(15)

100
(7.5)

RIC INC
US WH TAX

85
(10.5)

92.5
(12.8)

92.5
(6.38)

ATCF
ETR

74.5
25.5%

79.75
20.25%

86.13
13.88%

85
15%

92.5
7.5%

E. Is Treaty Shopping by RICs a Real Concern?
In the case of look-through treatment for all foreign source income (or
only tax-exempt foreign source income), a foreign investor may be able to
improve his or her after-tax cash flows by investing through a RIC instead
of investing directly. One can see this by comparing the after-tax cash flows
in Scenario 2 in Table 2 and Scenario 3 in Table 3 with the respective aftertax cash flows accruing to an investor resident in a country that does not
have a treaty with the source country. The reason that the after-tax cash
flows are greater in Scenario 2 in Table 2 is that the source basis tax on
dividends is reduced because of the U.S. treaty, and there is no residual
U.S. tax on the RIC dividends. In Table 3, the source basis tax on dividends
is reduced because of the U.S. treaty, and U.S. tax is imposed only on the
after-source-tax amount of the foreign source dividends. In essence, the
(reduced) source taxes are deducted prior to the application of U.S. tax, and
the sum of the source and U.S. taxes is slightly less than the source taxes
that would have been imposed in the case of direct investment without a
treaty.
The treaty shopping potential highlighted in Tables 2 and 3 may be
more illusory than real. In Table 3 (pass-through treatment only for untaxed
foreign source income), investing through a RIC improves after-tax cash
flows compared to direct investment only if the foreign investor’s country
of residence has a treaty with the United States but not with the source
country. This is unlikely given that many European trading and investment
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partners have entered into a significantly greater number of treaties than the
United States. The Netherlands, for example, has entered into over 100 tax
191
treaties compared with over sixty for the United States.
More importantly, the above scenarios ignore the residence country
treatment of the foreign taxes paid and focus solely on comparing the aftertax cash flows of a foreign investor, which implicitly treats all foreign taxes
as expenses. To the extent a foreign investor can credit any direct foreign
taxes paid (both U.S. taxes imposed on RIC dividends and source taxes paid
in the case of direct investment) against his or her residence basis taxes, the
treaty advantages garnered by investing through a RIC largely disappear,
and a foreign investor will always be better off by investing directly than
through a RIC.
To illustrate, assume that a foreign investor pays a 15% residence tax
on RIC dividends and on all direct investment income. In a regime in which
only untaxed foreign interest is passed through (Scenario 3 in Table 3), the
foreign investor will receive $86.13 of cash from the RIC ($92.5 less U.S.
tax of $6.38) and will owe residence tax of $13.88 ($92.5*15%). He or she
can credit against the residence liability the U.S. tax of $6.38, leaving
$78.63 of cash ($86.13 less $7.5 of residence tax liability). In contrast,
direct investment would leave the foreign investor with $85 of cash — the
source country tax is $15 and since the residence liability is also $15, the
investor receives a credit of $15, leaving $85.
In a regime in which all foreign source income is passed through
(Scenario 3 in Table 2), the foreign investor will receive $92.5 of cash from
the RIC and will owe residence tax of $13.88 ($92.5*15%). This leaves
$78.63 of cash. In contrast, direct investment would leave the foreign
investor with $85 of cash — the source country tax is $15, and since the
residence liability is also $15, the investor receives a credit of $15, leaving
$85.
When a foreign investor can fully credit any direct source basis taxes
against his or her residence tax liability, investing directly yields higher tax
cash flows than investing through a RIC. If we assume that investors are
rational, treaty shopping should not be a concern.
The legislative history to the foreign RIC provisions is silent on why
191

See Overview of Treaty Countries, BELASTINGDIENST [TAX & CUSTOMS
ADMINISTRATION], http:// www.belastingdienst.nl /wps / wcm / connect / bldcontenten /
belastingdienst/individuals/tax_arrangements/tax_treaties/overview_of_treaty_countries/;
United States Income Tax Treaties - A to Z, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (SERVICE),
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-Income-TaxTreaties—-A-to-Z.
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look-through treatment was not adopted for foreign source income,
including tax-exempt foreign source interest. Hence it is difficult to know
with certainty why it was not part of the final legislation. The above
examples demonstrate that the treaty shopping concern is probably
overblown in the case of untaxed foreign source income.
In a regime that provides for full look-through for all foreign source
income, the analysis is slightly more complex. A foreign investor benefits
by investing through a RIC only in cases where the residence country does
not allow a credit for direct foreign taxes or the foreign investor is not
subject to residence taxation. An investor could be tax-exempt if either the
entity was a pension or charity or the residence country did not tax the
foreign source investment income of its residents.
For the pensions and charities, one can probably assume that such
entities do not invest in RICs or that they could avoid source basis taxation
192
if they invested directly. If, however, they are subject to the same source
basis taxation as other foreign investors and do not benefit by a treaty,
investing through a RIC could improve their after-tax cash flows since such
entities are not taxable and any taxes are truly expenses.
Certain countries, e.g., the Cayman Islands, do not tax the foreign
193
source income of entities formed under their laws. If a full look-through
regime for foreign source income were adopted, foreign investors that
invest through entities formed in these countries could invest in a RIC and
obtain the benefits of U.S. treaties to lower their after-tax cash flows, even
though the investors may not have been able to obtain the same benefits had
they directly invested.
There is unfortunately no precise data on the value of shares of U.S.
RICs held by residents of (or entities formed in) such countries or a
breakdown of the type of RICs held by foreigners. Thus one cannot know
whether foreigners currently avoid global funds or invest in such funds
regardless of the U.S. tax treatment, whether foreigners migrated to U.S.focused funds when the foreign RIC provisions were enacted, or whether
non-treaty residents would migrate to foreign funds if the U.S. were to
enact a full look-through regime.
The total value of shares in open-end funds held by all foreign

192

See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, para. 3(b) (0% tax rate on
dividends paid to a pension).
193
http://www.dci.gov.ky/portal/page/portal/ivbhome/doingbusiness (“The government
does not impose personal or corporation income taxes and there are no taxes on profits and
gains from investments.”).
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investors at the end of 2014 was $606 billion, which represents an increase
194
of roughly 379% since the end of 2005. During this same period, foreign
investors’ percentage ownership of all RIC shares increased from 2.69% to
195
4.8%, an increase of 78%.
At the end of 2014, foreign investment in
open-end mutual funds represented 3.15% of the sum of direct foreign
investments in open-end RICs, U.S. corporate equities, U.S. corporate
bonds, U.S. Treasury securities, and Agency- and Government-Sponsored
Enterprise (GSE)-backed securities. This represents an increase of 64%
196
from the end of 2004. These data suggest that the foreign RIC provisions
may have stimulated investment in RICs.
According to data of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as of
June 30, 2014, all foreign investors held $1.039 trillion of shares of funds,
197
including mutual funds.
Treaty investors held $609 billion, or about
60%. The Federal Reserve data, however, includes hedge funds, and it is
consequently difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about the current
198
ownership of RICs by investors from treaty countries.
Congress may have eschewed look-through if it were concerned with a
RIC potentially foregoing treaty benefits to benefit foreign investors at the
expense of U.S. investors. For example, assume that a RIC earns some
interest from Country A that is taxed at 10% without any treaty benefits and
some interest taxed at 0% with treaty benefits. If a RIC were composed
primarily of foreign investors from countries with no U.S. treaty, it could be
beneficial for the RIC to forgo the treaty rate reduction so that the foreign

194

See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE: Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE
SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS, HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 2005–
2014, 102 tbl.L.132 (2015). Note, this data does not include money market mutual funds,
closed-end funds, or ETFs. Money market funds held by foreign investors totaled $113.4
billion at the end of 2014, up from $23 billion in 2005. Id.
195
See id.
196
See id.
197
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., & BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDING OF U.S. SECURITIES, 18–19 tbl.13,
A-24 tbl.A4. The data includes open-end funds, closed-end funds, money market funds, and
hedge funds. Id. at 18.
198
The country with the greatest value of fund assets, $164 billion (15.8% of the total),
was the Cayman Islands, which is a well-known country for hedge-fund formation. Id. at 19
tbl. 13. Another popular situs for hedge fund formation, the British Virgin Islands, invested
$39 billion (3.8% of the total) and was number 8 on the list. Id. at A-24 tbl.A4. If a hedge
fund is formed in the Cayman Islands and is taxed as a partnership, certain partners of the
fund may be eligible for treaty benefits. See supra Part III.E.
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investors could receive the interest free of U.S. tax as a QII dividend. If,
however, the RIC elected treaty benefits, the interest would be taxed at 0%
at the RIC level, but subject to a 30% U.S. withholding tax when
distributed.
Another reason Congress did not adopt look-through may have been to
200
bolster the U.S. treaty policy of treating RICs as treaty residents,
regardless of any LOB provision. A withholding tax on distributions of
foreign source income supports both the argument that a RIC is not a pure
pass-through entity because the foreign source income is not treated as
foreign source income when distributed and the argument that a RIC cannot
201
be used to treaty shop. This position has been advanced by the OECD
202
and the ICI in submissions to foreign governments.
This concern is a slightly novel twist on traditional U.S. concerns with
treaty shopping. U.S. tax authorities are generally concerned with foreign
investors attempting to obtain treaty benefits with respect to U.S. source
income by investing through an entity organized in a country with which
203
the United States has an income tax treaty.
The United States is

199

Under some bills introduced before the enactment of enactment of sections 871(k)
and 881(e), the definition of QII included foreign source interest “other than interest that is
subject to tax imposed by a foreign jurisdiction if the amount of such tax is reduced (or
eliminated) by a treaty with the United States.” See, e.g., H.R. 1669, 108th Cong. § 2(a)
(2003) (proposing new section 871(k)(1)(E)(ii)). Consequently, if the treaty interest
provision were not invoked, the interest would have been subject to a tax, but since the tax
would not have been reduced or eliminated by a treaty, it would have constituted QII. It is
possible that the Service would not have agreed with this interpretation of the statute. For
U.S. investors, the failure to elect treaty benefits could reduce the foreign tax credit, since
the foreign taxes may be treated as a “noncompulsory amount” under Treas. Reg. § 1.9012(e)(5)(i) (as amended in 2013).
Congress also may have eschewed look-through because it could have been difficult to
show that a 0% rate on interest was pursuant to domestic law and not pursuant to a treaty,
especially if a fund earned both tax-exempt portfolio interest and taxable interest. In such
case, a fund could opt not to invoke the treaty to preserve the 0% rate on the portfolio
interest.
200
See U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 142, at 13 (“[RICs and REITS] that are
nominally subject to tax but that in practice are rarely required to pay tax also would
generally be treated as residents and therefore accorded treaty benefits.”).
201
OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, para. 6.20 (a CIV whose distributions
to foreign investors are subject to a withholding tax presents less danger of treaty shopping).
202
See Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to Byung-Cheol
Kim, Dir. Corp. Tax Div., Korean Ministry of Strategy and Fin., supra note 146, app. at 3
(describing the significant adverse tax effect of non-U.S. investments in RICs).
203
U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 63 (“Article 22 contains anti-
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concerned that in the absence of impediments to treaty shopping, foreign
countries that do not have a treaty with the United States will not have an
incentive to enter into a treaty with the United States (and thus give up their
source basis revenues and enhance residence basis taxation) if their
residents can obtain treaty benefits with the United States by merely using
the treaty of a third country. Thus, treaty shopping has generally been
204
concerned with protecting U.S. tax on U.S. source income. In fact, with
respect to foreign source income earned by U.S. persons, the United States
generally benefits from U.S. investors lowering foreign taxes through tax
planning, including treaty shopping, because a reduction in foreign taxes
205
increases residence basis taxes.
The foreign RIC provisions have a decidedly different focus and effect.
By subjecting the foreign source income of RICs to U.S. tax, the United
States is not protecting U.S. taxes on U.S. source income but rather foreign
tax on foreign source income. In addition, the benefits of such protection do
not inure to the source country but rather to the United States.
The OECD considered this issue at length and proposed various
206
mechanisms to address treaty shopping. In general, the OECD provisions
focus on limiting a portion of a CIV’s treaty benefits at the source country
level based on the composition of a CIV’s owners. In essence, these
proposals move towards treating a CIV, for treaty purposes, as a partnership
rather than as a separate legal entity.
One OECD proposal would limit a CIV’s treaty benefits in proportion
207
to its ownership by equivalent beneficiaries.
Another would limit a
CIV’s treaty benefits in proportion to the percentage of the CIV’s owners
208
that are residents of the CIV’s country of residence.
Recognizing that
both of these approaches would impose substantial administrative burdens
treaty-shopping provisions that are intended to prevent residents of third countries from
benefiting from what is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries”).
204
See, e.g., Aiken, Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 925 (1971); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co.
v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 294 (1993), aff’d, 115 F.3d 506 (1997). The conduit financing
regulations, which permit an intermediate entity to be disregarded in certain financing
transactions, generally apply to determine the U.S. tax liability of a U.S. corporation. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (as amended in 2012).
205
For purposes of the business purpose test of section 355, the reduction of foreign
taxes is a valid business purpose. See Rev. Rul. 89-101, 1989-2 C.B. 67.
206
OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, paras. 52–57. The relevant revisions
to the OECD Model Commentary addressing treaty shopping are found in OECD, Model
Commentary, supra note 128, art. 1, paras. 6.19–6.32.
207
OECD, Model Commentary, supra note 128, art. 1, paras. 6.21–6.24.
208
Id. art. 1, para. 6.26.
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on a CIV to determine precisely the tax residence of its shareholders, the
OECD suggested that contracting states could consider adopting a provision
that would grant treaty benefits in their entirety to a CIV if at least a certain
percentage of the CIV’s shares were owned by equivalent beneficiaries or
209
residents of the CIV’s country of residence.
Current U.S. tax treaty policy endeavors to treat all RICs as qualified
persons, which ensures that their income, in its entirety, is eligible for treaty
210
benefits. The OECD proposals, which limit treaty benefits in proportion
to the identity of a CIV’s owners, may not currently be viable options for
the United States for two reasons. First, the withholding tax on a RIC’s
foreign source income paid to foreign investors ensures that RICs are not
211
viable treaty shopping vehicles.
Second, it is unclear how the OECD
proposals, which would treat a CIV’s income as partially qualified for
treaty benefits, would work in connection with the distribution of the CIV’s
income. For instance, if a CIV earns $100 and 80% of the investors are
equivalent beneficiaries (or U.S. residents) eligible for a 15% withholding
tax, under the OECD proposal, the 15% rate will apply to $80 of the income
paid to the CIV. When the CIV distributes all of its income, how are the
treaty benefits supposed to be allocated between the equivalent
beneficiaries (or residents) and nonequivalent beneficiaries (or
nonresidents)? Under U.S. law, there is currently no mechanism to make
such an allocation. Without a mechanism to allocate separately the treaty
benefits to the equivalent beneficiaries, the OECD proposals fall short of
212
“serv[ing] the goal of neutrality.”
Another weakness of the OECD approaches is that it is well nigh
impossible to know the identity of owners of shares held through financial
intermediaries. Furthermore, even if a CIV could determine that an owner
was, for instance, a U.K. person (individual or legal entity), it would be
quite burdensome to determine whether the person was actually a qualified
resident for treaty purposes. Also, the identity of the CIV’s owners changes
between the time the CIV receives the income and when the income is
distributed. The OECD recognized that daily tracing would be impossible
and impractical and suggested that contracting states accept practical
213
approaches that would not require daily tracing.
209

Id. art. 1, para. 6.27.
Nonpublicly traded RICs are treated as qualified residents in a sotto voce manner.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
211
OECD, Model Commentary, supra note 128, art. 1, para. 6.20.
212
Id. art. 1, para. 6.23.
213
Id. art. 1, para. 6.29.
210
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At least one U.S. treaty has adopted a look-through approach in
determining whether a CIV is entitled to treaty benefits. The 2006 protocol
to the U.S.-Germany treaty amended the LOB article to provide that a
German Investment Fund would be granted treaty benefits only if at least
90% of the shares were owned by German residents or equivalent
214
beneficiaries.
The reason apparently is that such funds exempt the
foreign source income from German tax when distributed to foreign
215
investors.
The technical explanation to the protocol states that the
competent authorities in determining indirect ownership may use
216
statistically valid sampling techniques.
Recognizing the important role that financial intermediaries play in the
custodianship of financial assets and the challenges of applying treaty
benefits to income earned on assets nominally held by such intermediaries,
the OECD put forth an implementation package in 2013 to allow
intermediaries to claim treaty benefits on a “pooled basis” on behalf of
217
customers.
The proposals aim to eliminate the need for individual
investors to apply for reduced source basis withholding by allowing the
intermediary to do so on their behalf without requiring the intermediary to
218
disclose the identity of its beneficial owners.
214

Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains to Certain Other Taxes, U.S.F.R.G., Aug. 29, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. 101-10, amended by Protocol Amending the
Convention Between the United States of America and The Federal Republic of Germany
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains to Certain Other Taxes, Signed on 29th August 1989,
U.S.-Ger., art. XIV, art. 28, para. 6, June 1, 2006, S. Treaty Doc. 109-20 [hereinafter “U.S.German Treaty”].
215
BROWN, supra note 128, at 41.
216
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL SIGNED
AT BERLIN ON JUNE 1, 2006 AMENDING THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME
AND CAPITAL GAINS TO CERTAIN OTHER TAXES art. XIV [hereinafter U.S.-Germany
Technical Explanation].
217
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Trace Implementation Package for
the Adoption of the Authorised Intermediary System (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/TRACE_Implementation_Package_
Website.pdf. The implementation package follows recommendations from OECD, POSSIBLE
IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 127, at 33–37 and OECD, TREATY BENEFITS CIVS, supra note
126, at paras. 38–40.
218
Id. The Trace Implementation Package provides a series of model agreements that
would be entered into by the financial intermediary and source country, and model

540

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 35:483

To date, no U.S. intermediary has entered into an authorized
219
intermediary agreement.
If a RIC is treated as a qualified person for
treaty benefits, these agreements would probably not be necessary since the
RIC would be entitled to treaty benefits. But if a source country views a
RIC as a pass-through and extends treaty benefits only to the extent that the
RIC’s owners are U.S. residents or equivalent beneficiaries, such an
agreement may be necessary to permit a RIC to obtain treaty benefits on
behalf of its investors.
F. Summary
The current U.S. tax regime penalizes foreign investors in U.S. RICs
to the extent a RIC earns foreign source income, as a foreign investor is
almost always worse off by earning foreign source income indirectly
220
through a RIC rather than earning it directly (or through a partnership).
Treaty shopping may be an illusory concern if one makes reasonable
assumptions about the residence basis taxes paid by foreign investors. The
final section discusses how the foreign RIC provisions could be modified to
better reflect their pass-through nature but without RICs becoming vehicles
that foster treaty shopping.
V. OPTIONS FOR FOREIGN MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS
This last part explores various options for foreign mutual fund
investors under current law and considers how Congress could modify
current law to reflect better the pass-through nature of RICs but still
mitigate treaty-shopping concerns. Given the large number of shareholders
of a typical RIC, certain options may not currently be administratively
viable.

agreements on CIVs under existing treaties. See, e.g., id. at 19; id. at 113. This reflects the
different approaches to treaty shopping discussed in OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra
note 126, paras. 6.21–6.24, 6.26.
219
The OECD has stated that “implementation of the recommendations of the TRACE
project was important for the practical application of [the conclusions in the CIVs Benefits
Report].” Revised Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, supra note 132,
at 8.
220
The only scenario in which a foreign investor is not penalized is when the foreign
source income is tax-exempt in the hands of the RIC and the foreign investor can avail
himself or herself of the benefits of a treaty with the United States so that the income is
taxed at 15%; but if the investor had earned the income directly from the foreign country, it
would have been taxed at 30%.
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A. Living with the Current RIC Regime
Under the current foreign mutual fund regime, foreign investors are
afforded look-through treatment for U.S. source interest and capital gains,
but not for foreign source income, which is subject to U.S. tax when
distributed. The obvious strategy is for foreign investors to avoid RICs with
foreign source income. This is not necessarily an easy task. While some
funds clearly have a mandate to invest in U.S. assets, e.g., a fund that holds
only U.S. treasuries, or foreign assets, e.g., an Asia or emerging markets
fund, others may invest in both U.S. and foreign assets, the respective
percentages of which can vary over time. Although mutual funds must
disclose their holdings quarterly, it is not always obvious whether a
221
particular issuer is foreign or domestic.
Given the importance of this
issue for foreign investors, consideration could be given to require funds to
disclose periodically the percentage of foreign assets they hold or foreign
222
income they earn.
Another more complicated self-help option is to trade around a fund’s
dividend distributions. A RIC that invests primarily in equities generally
pays dividends quarterly or yearly. The directors of the fund establish a
record date, which is the date on which an investor must be a shareholder
in order to receive a dividend. On the ex-dividend date, the fund’s NAV is
reduced by the distribution. This date is generally the date following the
record date. The shareholder of record receives the dividend on the payment
223
date, which is the generally the ex-dividend date.
The goal of this strategy is to avoid being a shareholder on the record
date. By selling before the record date, a shareholder in essence turns
224
dividend income into capital gain (loss).
For an open-end fund, a simple
strategy is to request redemption on the day before the record date and then
to reinvest on the record date. Since redemptions and contributions are
generally done at the fund’s NAV at day end, an investor following such a

221

The fund prospectus may disclose whether the fund may invest in foreign securities.
For the funds that disclose the amounts of QII and IRD, one can roughly determine
the percentage of foreign assets by examining the historical percentage of dividends that
constituted QII and IRD. In addition, in a fund’s financial disclosures, an investor can
observe the quantity of swap and securities lending income.
223
For publicly traded companies, there is generally a time lag between the record date
and payment date.
224
The exact amount depends on the appreciation or depreciation in the RIC shares,
which depends on the economic gains or losses of the fund since the shareholder purchased
his shares.
222
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strategy would not be a shareholder on the record date.
One downside to this strategy is the loss of any gains accruing on the
record date. This tradeoff may be acceptable if the distribution (and
corresponding tax avoided) is large and infrequent, say quarterly or
226
annually.
The efficiency of this strategy is diminished if the fund
imposes a redemption fee for short-term trading. Redemption fees typically
range from 0.75% to 2.00% with look-back periods of between seven and
227
ninety days.
Given an ordinary dividend distribution of 1.5%, a 1.5%
redemption fee is equivalent to a 100% tax and eliminates any benefit to
trading around the dividend distribution.
To avoid a redemption fee, a shareholder could remain on the sidelines
and forego any expected returns over the fee period. An alternative is to
trade out of the particular fund immediately before the record date and
228
invest the proceeds immediately in a similar fund.
Since most equity
funds are well diversified and have similar risk profiles, the returns of the
229
new fund would probably track closely the returns of the sold fund. To
the extent a fund pays more frequent dividends, this strategy becomes more
administratively burdensome and the loss of expected returns greater
(although the potential tax savings may be greater). This strategy is riskier
in the case of ETFs, as it requires selling and purchasing ETF shares on an
exchange. These purchases generate trading costs, such as brokerage fees
and selling at the “bid” price and purchasing at the “ask” price. These costs
may not be insignificant.

225

The board resolution authorizing payment of dividend generally authorizes payment
of dividends to shareholders of record at the opening of business on record date. Thus, a
shareholder who purchases shares on a particular day becomes a shareholder as of the end of
close of business and is therefore not a shareholder of record on that day for purposes of
dividends.
226
Assume that a fund has an expected annual return of 7% or an expected daily return
of 2.69 basis points, which is derived by solving the following equation: [((1+r)^252)1=.07], where 252 corresponds to the number of days during the year a shareholder can
redeem from an open-end fund. On an investment of $100,000, this corresponds to an
expected daily return of $26.90. For this strategy to be viable, the taxes avoided must be
greater than this amount.
227
For a list of funds and redemption fees see ALERUS, Funds Charging Fees (May 12,
2014), www2.alerusfinancial.com/arsws/feegrid.pdf.
228
If the investor wanted to invest in the original fund, it could withdraw from the new
fund and reinvest in the original fund once the redemption fee period expired.
229
The traditional measures of a fund’s risk are Beta and R2, which is a measure of how
much of a fund’s return is attributable to exposure to a particular index. These are available
from commercial vendors of mutual fund information, such as Morningstar.
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Even if these strategies enhance a foreign investor’s after-tax returns,
they are burdensome and should not be encouraged. Buying and selling
over the record date requires constant monitoring of dividend declarations
by boards and may generate trading costs that will diminish if not eliminate
any tax savings. It certainly is not economically viable for smaller
shareholders. The buying and selling of shares of open-end mutual funds
impose unnecessary tax and administrative costs on other shareholders, as
the fund may have to liquidate part of its holdings to satisfy redemption
230
requests, generating fund income that is taxed to all shareholders.
B. Full Pass-Through for Untaxed Foreign Source Income
Although various bills would have exempted from U.S. tax any
untaxed foreign source interest received by a RIC, Congress ultimately
rejected including this proposal as part of the final foreign RIC provisions.
For fixed income RICs, this would substantially mitigate the double
taxation of foreign source interest income. It also prevents treaty shopping,
since it applies look-through treatment only to income that does not benefit
from a U.S. treaty.
As shown in Table 3 above, under this proposal there would have been
an additional layer of U.S. tax on a RIC’s foreign source dividends and
swap income, regardless whether the income was actually subject to source
basis taxation, and on any interest subject to source basis taxation. Thus, for
RICs that invest in foreign equities the combination of source basis taxation
and the additional U.S. tax on foreign source dividends would still make
RICs relatively tax inefficient vehicles for foreign investors. If such a
proposal were again considered, look-through treatment should be extended
for other income that is exempt from source basis taxation, such as swap
231
income or even dividends that were not subject to source basis taxation.
C. Full Pass-Through for All Income
In a world in which there were no treaties and source investment
income were taxed at the same rates, adopting a complete pass-through
regime for a RIC’s foreign source income would significantly reduce
230

This occurs if redemption requests are greater than contributions. If contributions
are greater than redemption requests, a fund can satisfy the redemption requests with the
contribution proceeds.
231
The United Kingdom, for example, does not impose withholding taxes on dividends
paid to foreign residents.
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double taxation of investment income and move towards tax neutrality of
232
investing through a RIC and investing directly.
When a treaty applies,
however, a treaty resident gets the benefits of the treaty provisions, e.g.,
lower source basis taxation. Since a RIC is a treaty resident, treaty benefits
inure not to the RIC but to the RIC shareholders who benefit from the
reduced source basis taxes. If a RIC shareholder is a foreigner, the
shareholder gets the benefits of a U.S. treaty whether or not the foreigner is
a resident of a country with a treaty with the source country. This scenario
raises the specter of treaty shopping and appears to be the primary reason
Congress did not adopt full pass-through for foreign source income.
Similarly, a foreign RIC shareholder could pay source taxes by investing
through a RIC if the United States did not have a treaty with the source
country but the shareholder’s country of residence did.
Given that treaty benefits apply (or do not apply) at the RIC level and
not the shareholder level, currently the only somewhat crude mechanism to
prevent treaty shopping by foreign shareholders is for the U.S. to impose
tax on a RIC’s foreign source income when it is distributed.
Although treaty shopping is theoretically possible, the concern with
treaty shopping is probably overblown. First, most interest on publicly
traded portfolio debt is exempt from source basis taxation in the United
233
States and Europe.
Swap income is also generally exempt from source
basis taxation. Consequently, a RIC’s foreign investors do not need the
benefit of a treaty to obtain a 0% rate on portfolio interest or swap income.
For these types of income that are exempt from source basis taxation, there
is no risk of RICs being used to treaty shop by third-country investors.
Second, if one assumes that most foreign investors in a RIC can avail
234
themselves of a treaty with the source country if they invest directly,
given the similarity of treaty rates on dividends, interest, and swap income
(15%, 0%, and 0% respectively), the possibility of treaty shopping may be
remote: a treaty foreign investor is taxed at the same rate on such income
whether he or she invests directly or indirectly through a RIC.
232

A foreign investor could be slightly better off investing through a RIC with respect
to U.S. source income because investment expenses are deductible in computing ICTI but
are not deductible against FDAP income. See supra Part II.B. This is still the case under
current law.
233
See supra Part III.A.
234
For 2011, roughly 90% of U.S. source dividends were paid to residents of a country
with which the United States had an income tax treaty. See Luttrell, supra note 53, at tbl.2.
This data may overstate the percentage of dividends received by treaty residents if the
recipient is not a qualified person under a particular treaty.
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Furthermore, as shown above, for a foreign investor who is subject to
residence basis taxation and can credit direct foreign taxes against residence
basis taxation, there are virtually no circumstances in which a foreign
investor is better off by investing through a RIC than investing directly.
Finally, treaty shopping generally occurs in highly structured
transactions. A RIC’s foreign shareholders typically have little ability to
control the RIC’s investment decisions and direct the RIC to make
investments that are designed to enhance the after-tax returns for any
235
particular group of foreign investors.
The RIC diversification
requirement generally ensures that RICs hold a relatively diversified
portfolio. Consequently, no one issuer or group of issuers will likely
constitute a significant percentage of a RIC’s portfolio, and it is therefore
unlikely a foreign investor will significantly benefit from any potential
treaty shopping.
One potential consequence of adopting a full pass-through regime for
all of a RIC’s income is that U.S. treaty partners may argue that RICs
should be treated as pass-through entities for treaty purposes, which would
require each RIC shareholder to demonstrate that it was entitled to treaty
benefits. Alternatively, U.S. treaty partners could argue that a RIC’s
entitlement to treaty benefits should be limited based on the percentage of
236
foreign shareholders.
It is possible, however, to implement a full passthrough regime for RIC income if it were limited to treaty investors.
D. Full Pass-Through for Income of Treaty Investors
To both address concerns with treaty shopping by foreign investors and
ensure that investing through RICs remains tax-neutral, Congress could
consider modifying the current regime to permit full pass-through of
foreign source income (including income that would be foreign source if
directly received by a foreign investor) solely for investors that are eligible
for U.S. treaty benefits. Two assumptions underlie this proposal. First, an

235

It is possible that a fund family could establish a fund designed to provide benefits
for investors from a particular country (or countries). The circumstances in which this makes
sense are probably relatively limited. The OECD notes that justification for treating publicly
traded entities as being qualified residents is based on the fact that the owners cannot
individually exercise control over the entity. See U.S.-Germany Technical Explanation,
supra note 216, at art. XIV ¶ 6., see OECD, TREATY BENEFITS CIVS, supra note 126 at para.
57 and OECD, MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 128, art. 1, para. 6.32.
236
For a discussion of the OECD proposals to limit treaty shopping based on the
identity of a CIV’s owners, see supra Part IV.D.
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investor resident in a treaty country is probably not investing through a RIC
to garner untoward treaty benefits, since it is likely that the investor’s
country of residence has a similar treaty with the source country. Second,
since the United States has terminated its treaties with pure tax havens, the
countries with which the United States has treaties generally tax their
237
residents’ worldwide income. Thus, the RIC’s distributions will be taxed
on a residence basis.
Full pass-through of a RIC’s foreign source income for treaty investors
could be implemented in various ways. The simplest approach would be to
provide pass-through treatment for all foreign source income (and income
that would be treated as foreign source if directly received by a foreign
investor) for investors resident in a country with a U.S. treaty. Foreign
investors in a RIC would only pay tax generally on the portion of a RIC’s
238
dividend that was attributable to U.S. source dividends.
Precedent for such an approach can be found in treaties that extend
U.S. benefits to entities that are formed in a treaty country but owned by
residents of a third country who qualify as equivalent beneficiaries.
Because of the third-country ownership, such entities may not otherwise be
239
qualified persons under an LOB article.
An equivalent beneficiary is generally a resident of a EU country or
NAFTA signatory that is entitled to the benefits of an income tax treaty
240
between the beneficiary’s country of residence and the source country. In
addition, for interest and dividends, the rate under the equivalent
beneficiary’s treaty and the source country must be as least as low as the
241
rate under the treaty between the United States and the source country.
For example, if the treaty of the entity receiving a U.S. source dividend has
rates of 0%, 5%, and 15%, but the treaty of the equivalent beneficiary with
the United States has only dividend rates of 5% and 15%, the equivalent
242
beneficiary is only entitled to the 5% or 15% rate.
237

For entities that are tax-exempt in the residence, such as charities and pensions, the
evolving treaty policy is that these entities should also be exempt from source basis taxes.
Consequently, for these entities, treaty shopping should not be a concern.
238
There could be other relatively minor categories of U.S. source income that would
be taxable.
239
See, e.g. U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 3(a).
240
See, e.g. U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 7(d)(i)(A), as amended by
the Protocol, art. IV (defining equivalent beneficiary).
241
Id. art. 23, para. 7(d)(i)(B), as amended by the Protocol, art. IV.
242
See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Technical Explanation, supra note 142 (explaining art. 23, para.
3).
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The equivalent beneficiary provision is a type of derivative benefits
test that extends treaty benefits if the indirect recipient would have been
entitled to treaty benefits had he or she received the income from the source
country directly. The policy rationale behind an equivalent beneficiary
provision is that an entity formed in a treaty country that is owned by
equivalent beneficiaries was neither formed nor availed of to treaty shop,
because had the equivalent beneficiaries used an entity formed in their
countries or directly earned the income from the United States, they would
have been entitled to equivalent treaty benefits. In essence, the equivalent
beneficiary provision creates a multilateral treaty network based on bilateral
treaty relationships.
There are some important differences, however, between this proposal
and the operation of the derivative benefits provisions of current tax
treaties. Derivative benefits provisions generally apply only to entities that
are owned by seven or fewer equivalent beneficiaries. By limiting
derivative benefits to seven or fewer persons, the provision is much easier
to administer. In the case of a RIC, however, there may be tens or hundreds
of thousands of potential equivalent beneficiaries. The derivative benefits
provision generally applies to income arising in the source country and paid
to an entity owned by equivalent beneficiaries residing in up to seven
countries. In contrast, a RIC’s dividend income may arise from companies
that are residents of numerous countries and is paid to shareholders who are
residents of numerous countries.
Under the simple version of the full pass-through proposal, the foreign
investor would merely have to be resident of a country that had a treaty
with the United States; the foreign investor would not have to demonstrate
that it would have been eligible for treaty benefits with the source country.
Thus, it is possible that some RIC investors may not be true equivalent
beneficiaries in that they would not be entitled to treaty benefits with the
source country had they invested directly, or they may not be entitled to a
rate as low as the U.S. source country rate.
Although this is a reasonable objection, it does not appear to present
the potential for inappropriate results in most cases. First, the treaty rates
applicable to portfolio dividends, interest, and swap income are generally
uniform across treaties, since most treaties follow the OECD Model Treaty.
Thus, it is unlikely that a foreign investor would get more beneficial rates
under the U.S. treaty than under a treaty with the source country. In
addition, because the United States has entered into fewer treaties than
many of the countries that supply capital to the United States, it is more
likely that a RIC foreign investor would be a resident of a country that has a
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treaty with the source country than with the United States. Furthermore,
under this proposal, look-through would only apply if the foreign investor
had a treaty with the United States and not with the source country. Some
foreign investors would therefore be denied treaty benefits even though had
they invested in the source country, they would have been entitled to treaty
benefits.
An alternative approach that is consistent with the derivative benefits
provisions in current treaties but more complicated and administratively
burdensome would extend full look-through only to a treaty resident who is
an actual equivalent beneficiary, but extend the term to include any person
who would be eligible for source country treaty benefits. To implement
such an approach, the RIC would first have to apportion among separate
countries the foreign taxes it has paid and assign them to the appropriate
income categories, e.g., dividends or interest. For interest and dividends,
this is certainly manageable at the RIC level. When a RIC makes a
distribution to a foreign shareholder, the shareholder would have to
demonstrate that he or she was entitled to the benefits of a source country
treaty, i.e., that he or she was eligible for equivalent benefits for each
country’s taxes. For an equity RIC that earned dividends from fifteen or
twenty European countries, this would require a foreign shareholder to
demonstrate that he or she was eligible for derivative benefits for those
fifteen or twenty countries. Who would be responsible to confirm his
eligibility for derivative benefits, the RIC? A RIC could be required to
withhold at 30% when it distributes a dividend, and the foreign shareholder
could be required to demonstrate to the Service that it was entitled to
243
derivative benefits to receive a refund of U.S. withholding taxes.
This
approach would impose costs on foreign shareholders, which could be quite
significant, especially for smaller shareholders. It is not entirely clear how
the Service could determine whether a foreign shareholder was actually
244
entitled to derivative benefits.
Since both of these approaches are applied at the RIC shareholder
level, they differ from those considered by the OECD, which generally
243

This is generally how the U.S. collects tax from foreign sellers of U.S. real property
interests. See I.R.C. § 1445.
244
Foreign countries often withhold tax on payments to a U.S. person at regular rates
and require the recipient to demonstrate that it was a treaty resident. The U.S. person must
request the Service to certify treaty residence on Form 6166, which is requested by filing
Form 8802. If such an approach were adopted for foreign shareholders, each shareholder
would probably have to supply a similar treaty certification for each country. There is
currently a filing fee of $85 for U.S. taxpayers.
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would allow a CIV treaty benefit to the extent that it is owned by equivalent
245
beneficiaries or residents of the CIV’s country of residence. The OECD
approaches would harm a RIC’s shareholders who are not equivalent
beneficiaries or residents of the CIV’s country of residence because there is
no mechanism under Subchapter M to apply treaty benefits solely to such
246
shareholders when a RIC distributes its income.
It is not currently administratively feasible to require a foreign investor
to demonstrate that he or she is entitled to derivative benefits with respect
to foreign source income of a RIC, but it is easy and feasible to require a
foreign shareholder to show that he or she is entitled to U.S. treaty benefits.
Although this approach may extend look-through for shareholders who are
not true equivalent beneficiaries, it implements pass-through taxation while
protecting against treaty shopping. This proposal, coupled with the lack of
any credit for source basis taxes paid by a RIC, virtually ensures that
foreign investors would not invest through a RIC to treaty shop.
E. Pass-Through of Foreign Taxes
Even if Congress were to exempt from U.S. tax a RIC’s foreign source
income for treaty investors, such investors may still be economically worse
off by investing through a RIC than investing directly if the RIC’s foreign
source income is subject to source taxation. A RIC only distributes to a
247
foreign shareholder its after-foreign-tax income. Assuming the investor’s
country of residence does not permit a credit for source basis taxes levied
on the RIC’s income, a foreign investor gets only the benefit of a deduction
for source basis taxes paid by the RIC.
To illustrate, if a RIC earns $100 of foreign source dividend income on
which $15 of taxes are withheld by the source country, the RIC will
distribute only $85 to the foreign investor. Provided that there is no
additional U.S. withholding tax, the foreign investor would be subject to
residence basis tax on the $85 but would not receive a credit for the $15
source basis tax. Since the investor would only be taxed on $85, he or she

245

See supra Part IV.E.
Taxable shareholders of a RIC that makes a section 853 election may be indifferent
because they will merely have a larger foreign tax credit. Tax-exempt shareholders, such as
pensions or 401(k) accounts, will be harmed because the RIC’s NAV will be reduced by the
higher source country withholding taxes, which tax-exempt shareholders cannot use.
247
Under current law, foreign shareholders of a RIC that makes the foreign tax credit
election under section 853 may also be subject to U.S. tax on the foreign taxes paid by the
RIC. See infra Part III.B.
246
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receives in essence the benefit of a deduction for the source taxes, and there
is double taxation of the RIC’s income.
Under current law, when the RIC distributes $85, an additional 15%
(or 30%) U.S. withholding tax is levied, and the $85 is subject to residence
248
basis tax. Since the withholding tax is a direct tax, the foreign investor
should be able to credit it against his or her residence tax liability. Thus,
there is no double taxation of the $85 distributed, but again, the investor is
only receiving a deduction and not a credit for the source basis taxes paid
by the RIC.
Allowing a credit for source basis taxes may also be a possible
mechanism to mitigate the double taxation of foreign source income earned
through RICs. If the foreign investor were to receive a credit for source
basis tax and any U.S. tax, double taxation would be mitigated, and the
foreign investor would be in the same economic position as if the investor
249
had directly earned the income.
Using the same numbers in the above
examples, the foreign investor would have $100 of income and a potential
credit of $15 if the United States did not tax the RIC dividend and $27.75 if
250
the United States taxed the $85 RIC dividend at 30%.
A residence country could unilaterally implement such a rule, but it is
not clear whether a residence country would permit its residents to credit
251
the foreign taxes paid by a corporation of which they are shareholders.
The United States permits its residents to credit foreign taxes paid by RICs,
but generally does not permit taxes paid by a corporate entity to be credited
252
by individual shareholders. In contrast, foreign taxes paid by lower-tier
partnerships are passed through to a U.S. partner when the partner includes
in income the distributive share of the lower-tier partnership’s income.
248

Since withholding taxes are direct taxes, it is assumed that a foreign investor is
subject to residence basis taxation on the pre-tax amount of the dividend. If there were no
residence basis taxes, the residence country would presumably not permit a credit for any
foreign taxes.
249
Double tax would be mitigated but not eliminated unless the residence country gave
an unlimited credit for the total foreign taxes. Under U.S. law, for instance, a U.S. taxpayer
can only credit foreign taxes levied at a rate equal to or less than the U.S. rate on the foreign
source income. See I.R.C. § 904. The foreign investor is also not exactly in the same position
had he or she invested directly because of the additional layer of U.S. tax.
250
The $72.25 is grossed up by $12.75 U.S. tax and $15 foreign tax paid by the RIC.
251
There would have to be some mechanism for the RIC to provide the information to
foreign shareholders.
252
Certain corporate shareholders are permitted to credit taxes paid by other
corporations when the corporate shareholder receives a dividend. See I.R.C. § 902 (indirect
tax credit).
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The OECD addressed this issue and suggested that it could be solved
by including in the treaty between the CIV’s country of residence and the
investor’s country of residence a provision that would require the investor’s
country of residence to grant a credit for the source taxes imposed on the
253
CIV’s income. After noting various possible objections — the measure
would be an incomplete bilateral solution for a multilateral problem;
reciprocal benefits may not be provided by the source country; the
residence country could be required to grant relief greater than if an
investor had directly invested — the OECD indicated that investors had not
254
expressed an interest in making such claims. This could change if OECD
proposals in the OECD become widely implemented. Resolving this issue
will probably require a multilateral approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foreign RIC provisions mitigate tax inefficiencies to foreign
shareholders for a RIC’s U.S. source income, but the failure to adopt lookthrough for foreign source income means that many RICs continue to be
tax-inefficient investment vehicles for foreign investors. The current regime
is thus inconsistent with the pass-through nature of RIC taxation,
unnecessarily penalizes foreign investors in global RICs, and deprives the
United States of tax revenue from RIC-related income, such as trading and
management fees. Although treaty shopping may have been the primary
rationale for not adopting pass-through for foreign source income, those
concerns are largely illusory: a foreign investor potentially only benefits
from a treaty between the United States and the source country if there is no
residence taxation or the residence country does not credit U.S. taxes. By
limiting look-through to treaty residents, a clearly second-best option, treaty
shopping concerns should be entirely ameliorated and foreign investment in
U.S. RICs facilitated.

253

OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126 at paras. 41–47.
Id. at paras. 46 and 47. For a discussion see Gijs Fibbe, The 2010 Update of the
OECD Commentary on Collective Investment Vehicles, in THE TAX TREATMENT OF CIVS
AND REITS 67–71 (Hein Vermeulen ed., 2013).
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